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This Article explores the connection between corporate governance and 
D&O insurance.  It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guaran-
tors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks 
to maintain the profitability of their risk pools.  As a result, in a well-working 
insurance market, D&O insurance premiums would convey the insurer’s as-
sessment of a firm’s governance quality.  Simply stated, firms with better corpo-
rate governance would pay relatively low D&O premiums, while firms with 
worse corporate governance would pay more.  This simple relationship could 
signal important information to investors and other capital market partici-
pants.  Unfortunately, the signal is not being sent.  Corporations lack the in-
centive to disclose this information on their own initiative, and U.S. securities 
regulators do not require registrants to do so.  This Article therefore advocates a 
change to U.S. securities regulation, making mandatory the disclosure of D&O 
policy details—specifically, premiums, limits, and retentions under each type of 
coverage, as well as the identity of the insurer. 
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I.  GATEKEEPING 
Much of the blame for the recent spate of corporate governance 
scandals has fallen on gatekeepers.  Soon after the collapse of Enron 
and WorldCom, a leading corporate law scholar remarked that “En-
ron is more about gatekeeper failure than board failure.”1  Moreover, 
1 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron:  “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1419 (2002) [hereinafter Coffee, Understanding Enron].  Professor Cof-
fee’s fix for the gatekeeper crisis was a regime of strict liability for the outside auditor, 
essentially converting the auditor to an insurer.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Fail-
ure and Reform:  The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 349 
(2004) (“[T]he most direct and practical means [to improve corporate governance] 
would be to convert the gatekeeper into the functional equivalent of an insurer, who 
would back its auditor’s certification with an insurance policy that was capped at a real-
istic level.”); cf. Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?:  A Proposal for a Modified 
Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 492 (2001) (advocating a “modified strict 
liability regime,” under which “gatekeepers could limit their liability by agreeing to 
and disclosing a percentage limitation on the scope of their liability for the issuer’s 
damages”).  Comparing his proposal to Professor Coffee’s, Professor Partnoy wrote: 
The key to our proposals is the creation of a reinsurance market for securities 
fraud risks, where gatekeepers would behave more like insurers.  There are a 
variety of ways to do this.  Professor Coffee favors the use of caps based on a 
multiple of the gatekeeper’s revenues; I prefer limiting gatekeeper liability 
through contracting based on a percentage of the issuer’s liability.  
Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers:  A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 
365, 375 (2004).  Others have recently advanced a more direct insurance-market solu-
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although gatekeepers can include a variety of third-party intermediar-
ies—including auditing firms, debt rating agencies, equity analysts, in-
vestment bankers, and lawyers2—most of the post-Enron attention has 
been focused on the failings of the outside auditor.3  Yet for all of the 
focus on the shortcomings of the outside auditor, another potential 
gatekeeper has escaped notice—the directors’ and officers’ (D&O) 
liability insurer.4
Although their primary role is to spread the risk of loss from 
shareholder litigation, and not necessarily to provide the verification 
and certification services expected of third-party gatekeepers, D&O 
insurers have strong incentives to act as corporate governance gate-
keepers.  Because the D&O insurer assumes an insured’s risk of share-
holder litigation, the insurer must have a means of assessing that risk 
in order to determine an appropriate premium.  Insofar as the risk of 
shareholder litigation is related to the quality of a firm’s corporate 
governance, D&O insurers will use corporate governance assessments 
to screen prospective insureds and to quantify the risk of loss.  In a 
well-working insurance market, the D&O insurer will thus serve as an 
tion:  financial statement insurance.  See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gate-
keepers:  The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 
413, 415 (2004) (proposing that financial statement insurance, which would provide 
retroactive coverage for financial statements made during a specific year and “cover 
damages arising from audit failure,” would serve as an efficient monitor of corporate 
governance); Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform:  Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP 
Re-visited, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 48 (2002) (suggesting that financial statement 
insurance purchased by companies to “provide[] coverage to investors against losses 
suffered as a result of misrepresentation in financial reports” is an effective gatekeep-
ing mechanism). 
2 Professor Coffee defines gatekeepers as “reputational intermediaries who pro-
vide verification and certification services to investors.”  Coffee, Understanding Enron, 
supra note 1, at 1405; see also Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers:  The Anatomy of a Third-
Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986) (defining gatekeepers as 
“private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation 
from wrongdoers”). 
3 Most, not all.  See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. II 
2002) (adopting standards to increase the gatekeeping role of outside counsel); Claire 
A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly:  The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1145, 1148-
51 (2003) (describing the failure of debt rating agencies to act as gatekeepers); Susan 
P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud:  See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 195 (2003) (ar-
guing that a “lion-sized portion of blame” for Enron and other corporate governance 
crises rests with lawyers). 
4 On the ability of insurance generally to serve a gatekeeping function, see TOM 
BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 9 (2003), which discusses how various insurance 
arrangements perform a gatekeeping role, and RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE 
AS GOVERNANCE 3 (2003), which presents an ethnographic study to describe “how the 
insurance industry governs our lives.” 
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accidental gatekeeper, guarding the entrance of its risk pool by evalu-
ating the governance quality of prospective insureds. 
The D&O insurer’s incentive to serve as a corporate governance 
gatekeeper produces a simple but powerful hypothesis concerning the 
relationship of D&O insurance to corporate governance:  firms with 
worse corporate governance pay higher D&O premiums than firms with better 
corporate governance.  Details from a firm’s D&O policy should thus 
convey important information about the firm.  By examining an in-
sured firm’s premiums, limits, and retentions, and by controlling for 
such variables as market capitalization, volatility, and industry, inves-
tors and other capital market participants should be able to glean the 
insurer’s assessment of the quality of the firm’s corporate govern-
ance.5
This Article develops the governance-insurance link and explores 
its implications and limitations.  Part II examines the connection be-
tween corporate governance and shareholder litigation.  It argues that 
better corporate governance ought to lower a firm’s total costs from 
shareholder litigation, thus providing ample incentive for D&O insur-
ers to evaluate a firm’s corporate governance.  Part III reviews the role 
and function of D&O insurance in corporations, describing how D&O 
insurance works and why corporations buy it.  Part IV then considers 
the relationship between corporate governance and D&O insurance, 
arguing that D&O insurers should and in fact do take corporate gov-
ernance into account when writing (and pricing) D&O policies.  As a 
result, Part IV ultimately concludes that a firm’s D&O coverage ought 
to convey an important signal to investors and other capital market 
participants.  Unfortunately, as discussed in Part V, this signal is not 
reaching the market.  Corporations typically do not disclose the de-
tails of their D&O policies and, in the United States at least, there is 
no generally applicable rule forcing them to do so. 
There should be.  Because basic D&O policy details could signal 
important information to investors and thereby improve the efficiency 
of the capital markets, this Article argues that U.S. securities regula-
tion should be changed to require the disclosure of such information.  
The SEC has sufficient authority to make this change, which, as de-
scribed in Part V, would be technically simple and unlikely to incur 
principled opposition.  Moreover, the benefits of this change are po-
5 A policy’s “limit” is the total amount of coverage—that is, the maximum amount 
the insurer could be made to pay.  The “retention,” also referred to as the “deducti-
ble,” is the portion of the claim that the insured must pay even if the policy’s limits are 
not exhausted. 
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tentially large:  it will effectively uncover a new gatekeeper in Ameri-
can corporate governance and unleash a flood of useful information 
into the market.  The Article concludes that the SEC should change 
the law and require D&O insurance disclosure. 
II.  SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The hypothesis that D&O insurers function as corporate govern-
ance gatekeepers depends, first, on the relationship between share-
holder litigation and corporation governance.  As used in this Article, 
“shareholder litigation” refers to all claims covered under a D&O pol-
icy, whether brought by a shareholder or a regulatory agency, for 
which the resolution depends upon corporate or securities law.6  The 
Article gives a similarly expansive definition to “corporate govern-
ance,” defining it broadly to refer to any policies or structural mecha-
nisms affecting management of a firm.7  If there were no relationship 
6 See, e.g., Am. Int’l Group (AIG), Executive and Organization Liability Insurance 
Policy § 2(z) (Feb. 2000), http://www.aignationalunion.com/nationalunion/public/ 
natfiledownload/0,2138,2634,00.pdf? [hereinafter AIG Specimen Policy] (covering 
“any actual or alleged breach of duty, neglect, error, misstatement, misleading state-
ment, omission or act or any actual or alleged Employment Practices Violation . . . with 
respect to an Executive of an Organization”); Chubb Corp., Executive Protection Port-
folio:  Executive Liability and Entity Securities Liability Coverage 7 (Nov. 2002), 
http://csi.chubb.com/products/pdf-files/14027303.pdf [hereinafter Chubb Specimen 
Policy] (covering “any other matter claimed against an Insured Person solely by reason 
of his or her serving in an Insured Capacity”); Hartford Fin. Prods.,  Directors, Officers 
and Company Liability Policy § IV(O) ( June 1996), http://www.hfpinsurance.com/ 
forms/nj85.pdf [hereinafter Hartford Specimen Policy] (covering “any matter claimed 
against the Directors and Officers solely by reason of their serving in such capacity”).  
Although D&O policies may also cover employment-related claims against directors 
and officers, employment claims are an important component of D&O coverage only 
for nonpublic companies.  See TILLINGHAST, TOWERS PERRIN, 2004 DIRECTORS AND OF-
FICERS LIABILITY SURVEY 4 (2004) [hereinafter TILLINGHAST 2004 SURVEY] (reporting 
that 57% of the claims against public companies were brought by shareholders and 
that 96% of the claims brought against nonprofits were brought by employees); see also 
Interview with Confidential Source, D&O Advisor, Outside Counsel, in New York, N.Y. 
(Oct. 12, 2004) (transcript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) 
[hereinafter D&O Advisor Interview] (confirming that for public companies, share-
holder litigation is by far the larger liability risk under a D&O policy).  Therefore, al-
though employee claims may introduce some noise into the signal sent by the D&O 
premium, the distortion should be minimal for public companies, given the dominant 
role of shareholder claims. 
7 Questions of which specific governance terms and policies matter most are be-
yond the scope of this Article.  There is considerable academic debate over which gov-
ernance terms are the best predictors of shareholder returns.  See generally Paul Gomp-
ers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 109-10 (2003) 
(describing how an index of corporate governance provisions correlates with “returns, 
firm value, and operating performance”); Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corpo-
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between shareholder litigation and corporate governance, then the 
D&O insurer could not improve the quality of its risk pool by evaluat-
ing a firm’s corporate governance.  As a result, insurance premiums 
would have nothing more than a random, accidental relationship to 
corporate governance.  This Part argues, however, that the relation-
ship between corporate governance and shareholder litigation is 
strong enough to support the insurer-as-gatekeeper hypothesis. 
Shareholder litigation typically involves three types of claims:  
shareholder derivative actions, shareholder direct actions, and securi-
ties fraud claims.  Derivative suits—actions brought by shareholders 
on the corporation’s behalf to recover for a manager’s breach of 
duty—were once thought to exert an important constraint on mana-
gerial agency costs.8  Now, however, a wide variety of procedural 
mechanisms enables boards to terminate such claims early and at rela-
tively low cost.9  In addition to the derivative suit, state corporate law 
rate Governance? 33-34 ( John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., 
Discussion Paper No. 491, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423 (argu-
ing that provisions indicating managerial entrenchment matter most for shareholder 
returns); K.J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices 
3-5 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 03-15, 2004), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=412140 (exploring how corporate governance mechanisms affect 
firm value); Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance 3 (Dec. 7, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=586423 (evaluating the rela-
tionship between certain corporate governance data and “operating performance, 
valuation, and cash payouts”).  The question of which governance terms are the best 
predictors of shareholder litigation is, of course, distinct.  See, e.g., William H. Beaver, 
What Have We Learned from the Recent Corporate Scandals That We Did Not Already Know?, 8 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 155, 163 (2002) (predicting earnings restatements and litigation 
activity for high-growth firms with managers who are overcommitted to continued 
growth and arrogantly view internal controls or financial reporting as a nuisance, sub-
servient to their entrepreneurial goals); Eric Helland & Michael Sykuta, Who’s Monitor-
ing the Monitor? Do Outside Directors Protect Shareholders’ Interests?, 40 FIN. REV. 155, 157 
(2005) (finding that firms with a higher proportion of inside directors have a higher 
probability of being sued by their shareholders).  The question of which corporate 
governance variables insurers believe are most important is the subject of an empirical 
project that I am currently undertaking with my colleague Tom Baker. 
8 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (stating 
that the derivative action, “born of stockholder helplessness, was long the chief regula-
tor of corporate management” and noting the argument that “without it there would 
be little practical check on such abuses”).  This Article will refer to the divergence of 
interests between management and shareholders as “agency costs.”  See generally Mi-
chael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) (identifying the diver-
gence in interests between principal and agent as a central feature of the separation of 
ownership and control). 
9 These include the requirement that the plaintiffs make demand on the board 
and, in some states, post a bond for corporate defense costs.  More broadly, procedural 
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also allows shareholders to sue individually or as a class when they can 
allege an injury that is not derivative of an injury to the corporation.10  
These direct claims, typically brought as class actions challenging 
board conduct in the context of takeovers or acquisition transactions, 
have come to dominate state corporate law filings.11  They are not as 
easily terminated as derivative claims and, according to some com-
mentators, target precisely those transactions in which agency costs 
are potentially highest.12  Finally, securities litigation may be brought 
in many of the same situations that give rise to state corporate law 
claims.13  Although such claims must be framed around misrepresen-
tations or inadequacies in corporate disclosure,14 the basic concern—
that company managers have misused their positions to the disadvan-
tage of their shareholders—is the same whether the complaint is 
hurdles include the business judgment rule and the ability of a special litigation com-
mittee to wrest control of the litigation from the plaintiff.  See generally N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW § 627 (McKinney 2003) (requiring the posting of a bond); Grimes v. Donald, 673 
A.2d 1207, 1215-17 (Del. 1996) (discussing the demand requirement); Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981) (explaining the role of the special litigation 
committee); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001 (N.Y. 1979) (shielding the de-
cisions of a special litigation committee from judicial scrutiny).  These procedural ob-
stacles reflect the widely held view that derivative litigation is a corporate nuisance, of 
value only to plaintiffs’ attorneys, leading some to argue that the derivative action 
should be abolished.  See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 
403-04 (2002) (proposing the elimination of derivative litigation). 
10 See Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1213-15 (discussing the distinction between derivative 
and direct claims). 
11 See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litiga-
tion:  Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 137 & n.12 (2004) (finding 
that approximately 80% of all fiduciary duty claims filed in Delaware Chancery Court 
in 1999 and 2000 were class actions challenging board conduct in an acquisition, 
whereas only 14% of fiduciary duty claims over the same period were derivative suits). 
12 See id. at 139 (“[S]hareholder acquisition litigation polices those management 
transactions with the highest potential for self-dealing.”).  But see Elliott J. Weiss & Law-
rence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride:  How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class 
Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1803-04 (2004) (finding high litigation agency costs in 
acquisition-oriented class actions). 
13 See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Govern-
ance:  Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 861 (2003) (arguing that outside 
of the contexts of self-dealing and acquisitions, “corporate governance . . . has passed 
to federal law and in particular to shareholder litigation under Rule 10b-5”). 
14 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988) (allowing a 10b-5 
claim to survive dismissal on the basis of an allegation that shareholders sold at a price 
reflecting the company’s false or misleading statements, thereby replacing traditional 
notions of fraud with the “fraud-on-the-market” theory). 
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framed under corporate or securities law.15  The biggest difference, it 
seems, is the potential for damages, with securities litigation present-
ing by far the greatest liability threat to corporations and their man-
agers.16
A long list of actions may give rise to one or more of these forms 
of shareholder litigation.  A leading treatise provides a 170-item 
checklist of potential bases for liability with category headings includ-
ing “Governance, Management and Business,” “Informed Business 
Judgment,” “Unauthorized or Ultra Vires Actions,” “Self-Dealing and 
Conflicts of Interest,” “Change of Control Situations,” and “Disclo-
sures.”17  The common theme underlying all of these liability threats, 
however, is a corporate structure that enables managers to act selfishly 
and contrary to the best interests of their shareholders.18  Whether 
shareholders bring a derivative claim alleging a wealth transfer from 
shareholders to management, a direct action claiming that an en-
trenched board has not acted to maximize shareholder wealth in the 
context of a takeover, or a securities claim alleging that managers mis-
stated earnings in order to protect their incentive compensation 
packages, the underlying issue is the failure of the corporation to de-
sign a structure to constrain its managers from acting to benefit them-
15 See Thompson & Sale, supra note 13, at 903 (citing as the concern underlying all 
forms of shareholder suits “that management has misused its position with respect to 
corporate assets”). 
16 See, e.g., ELAINE BUCKBERG ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN 
SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION:  BEAR MARKET CASES BRING BIG SETTLE-
MENTS 4 (2005), available at http://www.nera.com/image/Report_WEB_Recent_ 
Trends_2.2005.pdf (reporting that the mean securities settlement increased by 33% in 
2004 to $27.1 million and stating that, although the median settlement fell slightly 
from $5.5 million to $5.3 million, the “increase in mean settlements cannot be ex-
plained by a handful of extraordinary settlements”); LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. 
RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST-REFORM ACT SECURITIES LAWSUITS:  SETTLE-
MENTS REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 2003, at 4 (2004), available at http:// 
securities.stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW_1995-2003/2003_Settlements.pdf (report-
ing that “average ‘estimated damages’ [in securities claims] have consistently in-
creased” since 1997). 
17 2 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND 
DIRECTORS § 17.02 (7th ed. 2002). 
18 Although some shareholders may benefit from, for example, overstated earn-
ings—specifically, those who sell prior to the earnings correction—shareholders as a 
whole and prospective shareholders, especially those who buy prior to the earnings 
correction, are harmed.  On the potential for conflict between present and future 
shareholders’ interests, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives:  Resolving the Con-
flict Between Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044, 1045 (2005). 
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selves at the expense of shareholders.19  Much shareholder litigation, 
in other words, arises as a result of managerial agency costs.20
Good governance ought to lead to less litigation.  Corporate gov-
ernance constraints are designed to control managerial agency costs.  
By preventing the defections from shareholder interests that lead to 
lawsuits, better corporate governance should result in less shareholder 
litigation.  Alternatively, even if it cannot prevent managers from be-
having opportunistically, good corporate governance may enable the 
detection and eradication of such behavior, thereby limiting the total 
loss to shareholders and, ultimately, the cost of litigation.21  In other 
words, insofar as managerial agency costs underlie shareholder litiga-
tion and corporate governance constrains managerial agency costs, 
better governance ought to translate into less litigation or, at least, less 
costly claims. 
The assertion that better governance leads to less litigation is not 
the same as the assertion that litigation will lead to better governance.  
Indeed, there is considerable doubt concerning the latter proposition.  
In an influential study of derivative litigation, for example, Professor 
Roberta Romano concluded that “shareholder litigation is a weak, if 
not ineffective, instrument of corporate governance.”22  The funda-
mental insight driving this analysis can be characterized as “litigation 
agency costs”—that is, the divergence between the interests of the 
plaintiffs’ attorney controlling the litigation and the shareholder 
plaintiffs that the attorney supposedly represents.23  This disconnect 
leads plaintiffs’ lawyers both to file claims that shareholders would 
prefer not to press,24 and to settle claims that shareholders would pre-
19 The same harm may thus give rise to a claim under corporate law, whether de-
rivative or direct, and securities law.  See Thompson & Sale, supra note 13, at 904 (not-
ing the overlap in potential causes of action). 
20 See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 309-10 (discussing agency costs 
in firms). 
21 See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 47-48 
(1996) (discussing the costs of opportunism). 
22 Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:  Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 55, 84 (1991). 
23 See id. at 57 (“[A]ttorneys’ incentives are the key factor in shareholder litiga-
tion.”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion:  The Plaintiff as Monitor in 
Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 12 (1985) (discussing the problem 
of litigation agency costs). 
24 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 437, 437-41 (1988) (providing a formal model of the incentive of plaintiffs’ at-
torneys to file frivolous suits); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement 
of Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 5 (1990) (same); D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A 
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fer to pursue.25  Litigation agency costs thus distort the ability of 
shareholder litigation to check managerial agency costs.26
Skepticism that shareholder litigation operates as an effective gov-
ernance constraint should not, however, be taken as reason to doubt 
that effective corporate governance will lead to less shareholder litiga-
tion.27  Litigation agency costs disrupt the causal connection between 
litigation and governance, but not necessarily the link between gov-
ernance and litigation.  The distortion of litigation agency costs arises 
only after conduct giving rise to a potential claim has occurred, at 
which point plaintiffs’ lawyers may pursue nuisance suits and settle 
valid claims so that the ultimate result bears little relation to the so-
Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3-4 
(1985) (same). 
25 Cf. Romano, supra note 22, at 61 (finding that although only half of the settle-
ments in her sample resulted in any recovery to shareholders, 90% awarded attorneys’ 
fees).  See generally Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal 
Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERTAURE 1067, 1075-82 (1989) (summariz-
ing various settlement theories).  On the question of when shareholder litigation 
should and should not be pursued, see Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder 
Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1737-44 (1994). 
26 See Romano, supra note 22, at 55 (“The efficacy of shareholder litigation as a 
governance mechanism is hampered.”).  See generally Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethink-
ing Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1488-89 (1996) (proposing 
alternatives to securities litigation); Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nui-
sance-Value Settlement Problem:  Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1850-51 
(2004) (discussing nuisance value strategies); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:  Economic Analysis 
and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19 (1991) (recommending 
changes in the system); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors:  A Proposal to Replace Class 
Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 947-49 (1999) (dis-
cussing class actions and their competing goals of compensation and deterrence).  The 
problem of litigation agency costs also shaped the reforms adopted in the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as 
amended in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78), which includes titles dealing 
with reductions of “abusive litigation” and “coercive settlements.”  D&O insurance ar-
guably exacerbates these distortions by effectively releasing directors and officers from 
the threat of personal liability.  See James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of 
Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 21-37 (1997) (weighing arguments 
that insurance undercuts the deterrent effects of shareholder litigation). 
27 Skepticism on this later point would tend to lead to the cynical view that share-
holder litigation is essentially random, unable to serve either a compensatory or deter-
rence function, and therefore ought to be abolished.  See generally James D. Cox, Com-
pensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 745, 775-76 (1984) (noting that deterrence seems to dominate compen-
satory objectives in derivative suits); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies 
and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (1984) (noting the essential deter-
rence function of shareholder litigation). 
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cially optimal sanction for the conduct.28  Corporate governance 
mechanisms, by contrast, operate before the harmful conduct has oc-
curred.  Because corporate governance operates at a level prior to the 
introduction of litigation agency costs, and therefore may prevent the 
harm from ever taking place, corporate governance has a more direct 
impact on shareholder litigation than shareholder litigation does on 
corporate governance.29  Stated most concisely, better corporate gov-
ernance should lead to less shareholder litigation regardless of 
whether shareholder litigation leads to better corporate governance. 
It is, of course, possible to press the objection, arguing that litiga-
tion agency costs are so severe that they have effectively unmoored 
shareholder litigation from underlying corporate governance prac-
tices.  In this vein, critics often argue that securities class action filings 
cluster around sudden declines in stock price rather than any solid 
evidence of corporate misfeasance.30  Members of the plaintiffs’ bar 
have sought to rebut this argument, citing studies that find relatively 
few cases accompanying sharp declines in stock price.31  To argue 
28 Cf. Kraakman et al., supra note 25, at 1741 (arguing that shareholders would like 
suits to be brought only when the suit would increase share value as measured by de-
terrence benefits plus expected recoveries minus litigation expenses and ex ante salary 
and insurance adjustments). 
29 The problem may be conceptualized on a three-point timeline, placing in order 
(1) the firm’s initial governance structure, (2) shareholder litigation, and (3) the 
firm’s postlitigation governance structure.  Because litigation agency costs arise with 
the litigation, they disrupt the causal chain between points (2) and (3), but not be-
tween points (1) and (2).  A firm’s initial governance structure should affect share-
holder litigation at point (2) regardless of whether litigation at point (2) affects the 
governance structure at point (3). 
30 See, e.g., Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws:  Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 3 
(1993) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Chair-
man, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs) (“Companies, particularly 
growth firms, say they are sued whenever their stock drops.”); id. at 5 (statement of 
Sen. Pete V. Domenici, Member, S. Subcomm. on Securities) (“[R]ule 10(b)(5) law-
suits can be filed within weeks, sometimes days, or even in hours after a stock drops in 
price.”); id. at 16 (statement of Richard J. Egan, Chairman, EMC Corp.) (“[Suits] are 
typically filed within days or sometimes hours of a company’s announcement of ad-
verse news and disappointing earnings.”); see also Michael Selz, Lawsuits Often Follow 
When Small Firms Go Public, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1992, at B2 (reporting the high fre-
quency of shareholder lawsuits when a company’s stock price drops sharply soon after 
a public offering). 
31 See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and 
Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 309-14 (1994) (testimony of 
Leonard B. Simon, Partner, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach) (demonstrating 
quantitatively that only a small portion of 10% or greater one-day drops in stock price 
result in class action suits against the company). 
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about the filing of securities or other shareholder litigation claims, 
however, is to miss the point.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys may file claims 
without much investigation because some claims will not yield solid 
evidence of fraud until some time after the initial decline in stock 
price.32  As a result, some claims will be meritorious regardless of the 
amount of investigation at the time of filing, while others will turn out 
to be meritless and, therefore, will be quickly dropped or easily dis-
missed.33  Thus, regardless of the dynamics at filing, the real issue is 
whether meritorious claims are more difficult to dismiss or more 
costly to settle.  In other words, do firms with better corporate govern-
ance face lower overall costs from shareholder litigation? 
Securities law scholars have addressed this question by investigat-
ing whether firms face similar or different costs from shareholder liti-
gation.  Their principal data source has been settlement amounts.  
Variance in settlement amounts would suggest that idiosyncratic vari-
ables, such as the merits of a particular claim or the quality of a par-
ticular firm’s corporate governance, explained settlement outcomes, 
but if settlement amounts tended to cluster along the lines of a simple 
variable, such as alleged damages or market capitalization, the data 
would seem to suggest that outcomes are explained by features other 
than the merits of particular claims or the attributes of individual 
firms.  Professor Janet Cooper Alexander’s famous study of securities 
settlements employed precisely this methodology, finding that most 
settlements in her sample followed a very simple “‘going rate’ of ap-
proximately one quarter of the potential damages.”34  The implica-
tion, which became highly influential in the call for securities law re-
form,35 was that the merits of individual claims do not determine 
settlements and therefore do not matter in securities class actions. 
32 See generally David L. Gilbertson & Steven D. Avila, The Plaintiffs’ Decision to Sue 
Auditors in Securities Litigation:  Private Enforcement or Opportunism?, 24 J. CORP. L. 681, 
684 (1999) (studying the length of time between market reaction and filing of suit). 
33 This, of course, assumes that nonmeritorious claims are more easily dismissed 
or otherwise cheaply resolved.  See Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter:  A 
Comment on Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Secu-
rities Laws:  The Commission’s Authority,” 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 455 (1994) (“A substan-
tial percentage of Rule 10b-5 claims are dismissed by courts on a motion by defen-
dants.  This suggests that many nonmeritorious suits do not survive until settlement.”). 
34 Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?  A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 500 (1991) (concluding that the merits do not mat-
ter). 
35 See William S. Lerach, “The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995—27 
Months Later”:  Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act’s Brave New World, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 598 (1998) (stating that Congress “relied 
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Alexander’s study has been criticized for various methodological 
flaws—that the merits do not matter is, after all, a rather broad con-
clusion to draw from a sample of only eight cases within the same in-
dustry in the same year.36  But the study’s gravest error is its failure to 
control for broader market declines that may have accompanied the 
drop in the defendants’ stock price.37  This is a critical adjustment be-
cause each defendant would have had the opportunity to argue nega-
tive causation—that is, that part of the drop in stock price was due to a 
broader market decline, as measured by some market index.38
Negative causation introduces an important difference into Alex-
ander’s otherwise homogeneous sample:  each company had a differ-
ent market window for mitigating damages based on broader market 
declines.  Therefore, adjusting the decline in each company’s stock 
price for general market declines significantly changes the potential 
damages for each claim.  Recalculating the settlement amounts as 
percentages of potential damages so adjusted, Professors Elliott Weiss 
and John Beckerman found that Alexander’s 25% “going rate” could 
no longer be supported.39  Instead, settlements varied considerably, 
between about 23% and 80% of recoverable damages, suggesting that 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the particular claims, such as their indi-
heavily upon Professor Janet Cooper Alexander’s article” in enacting the Private Secu-
rities Litigation Reform Act of 1995). 
36 See Leonard B. Simon & William S. Dato, Legislating on a False Foundation:  The 
Erroneous Academic Underpinnings of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 966-76 (1996) (arguing that Alexander’s methodology was 
flawed, in part due to her sample’s small size and homogeneity).  Simon and Dato 
went further, seeking to replicate Professor Alexander’s results with a slightly larger 
sample, but failing to do so.  They found instead that settlements varied widely (be-
tween 0% and 70% of potential damages), even when not adjusting for market-wide 
movements.  Id. at 996. 
37 See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 
497, 503 (1997) (pointing out this omission and concluding that Professor Alexander 
did not therefore prove her thesis). 
38 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2000) (“[I]f the defendant proves that any portion or all 
of such damages represents other than the depreciation in value of such security re-
sulting from [the alleged fraud], . . . such portion or all such damages shall not be re-
coverable.”); Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397, 407-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (recognizing 
the potential validity of a negative causation defense to a fraudulent registration 
claim); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 
1971) (adjusting a damage award downwards to account for a drastic decline in the 
stock market). 
39 Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:  How Insti-
tutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 
2084 (1995). 
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vidual merits, may indeed have influenced outcomes at settlement.40  
Several other empirical studies reaching the same conclusion as Alex-
ander’s suffer from similar methodological defects.41
The question of whether the merits matter in securities litigation 
may require a more nuanced answer than a simple yes or no.  Several 
studies by National Economic Research Associates, Inc. (NERA), a re-
search and consulting firm affiliated with the insurance industry, have 
returned ambiguous results, finding that although the merits of secu-
rities litigation seem to matter less than other factors, they nevertheless 
retain some explanatory force.42  More recently, Professor Stephen 
Choi reviewed empirical research on the merits of securities litigation 
both before and after passage of the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995 (PSLRA),43 and summarized the findings as follows: 
40 Id.; accord Simon & Dato, supra note 36, at 990 (analyzing Alexander’s sample, 
factoring in general market forces, and finding that adjusted settlement figures varied 
between approximately 3% and 80% of potential damages).  See generally Willard T. 
Carleton et al., Securities Class Action Lawsuits:  A Descriptive Study, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 491, 
494-99 (1996) (describing various models of damages, the assumptions each model 
makes, and the widely differing results each model gives). 
41 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 30, at 46-48 (statement of Dr. Vincent E. 
O’Brien, Law and Economics Consulting Group, Inc.) [hereinafter O’Brien Senate 
Statement] (finding that securities class action settlements from 1988 to 1993 clustered 
at 6% of total trading losses, but failing to adjust for “actual damages” under the secu-
rities laws). 
42 Compare, e.g., Denise N. Martin et al., Recent Trends IV:  What Explains Filings and 
Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 122-23 (1999) (rep-
resenting NERA and rejecting the hypothesis that securities litigation produces opti-
mal deterrence of corporate wrongdoing,  but finding that “the timing of settlements 
may indeed be reflective of a case’s merits” and that “only a portion of low-valued set-
tlements are likely to be nuisance suit settlements”), with Frederick C. Dunbar & Vinita 
M. Juneja, NERA, Recent Trends II:  What Explains Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions? 
(1993), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 30, at 739, 747-48 (“[N]o factor on which 
we have data, other than investor losses, plaintiffs’ damage estimate, and number of 
insurable co-defendants, has consistent, statistically significant impacts on settlement 
size.”).  The older NERA study goes on to state: 
Our statistical results . . . leave almost 60 percent of the dispersion in settle-
ments unexplained.  Some of this unexplained variation may be due to factors 
reflecting the merits about which we have no data.  Also, because investor 
losses may be correlated with either availability of assets or actual damages, 
some of the explanation of settlement size may depend upon potential dam-
age exposure which in turn may be reflecting the merits of a case. 
Id. at 748. 
43 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered subsections 
of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78). 
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[T]he existing literature on filings and settlements in the post-PSLRA 
time period provide[s] evidence that frivolous suits existed prior to the 
PSLRA and that a shift occurred in the post-PSLRA period toward more 
meritorious claims.  Lawsuits relating to more obvious indicia of fraud, 
such as accounting restatements, are more prevalent in post-PSLRA fil-
ings and are more important in determining outcomes in the post-
PSLRA time period.  Cases also seem to take longer to settle in the post-
PSLRA period, indicating perhaps more work on the part of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys in litigating these suits.44
The PSLRA, in other words, made the merits matter more than they 
previously had. 
This Article’s thesis does not require the merits to be all that mat-
ters in shareholder litigation.  As long as the total cost of shareholder 
litigation depends, at least in part, on corporate wrongdoing that can 
ultimately be traced to a failure of corporate governance, firms with 
better corporate governance should face lower total costs in share-
holder litigation.  Better governed firms will suffer fewer meritorious 
claims and pay less in total litigation costs than similarly situated firms 
with relatively worse corporate governance because, when nonmerito-
rious claims do arise, they are resolved more cheaply than meritorious 
claims.  Because insurers are the parties ultimately on the hook for 
these costs,45 they have ample incentive to inquire into a firm’s corpo-
rate governance practices before selling it a D&O policy. 
44 Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 
1498 (2004).  On the shift toward more objective evidence of corporate fraud in secu-
rities litigation, see Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More After Securi-
ties Litigation Reform?  Evidence from Restatements, Earnings Forecasts and Insider 
Trading 2 ( July 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=589221 (“[W]e find a significantly 
greater correlation between litigation and both earnings restatements and insider trad-
ing after the PSLRA.”). 
45 See O’Brien Senate Statement, supra note 41, at 48 (indicating that 94% of secu-
rities class action settlements are within typical insurance coverage limits and that in-
surance proceeds are usually the sole source of settlement funds). 
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III.  THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF D&O INSURANCE 
D&O insurance arose in the 1950s and 1960s as a species of the 
basic liability policies that insurers had long marketed.46  The first 
D&O policies were not well adapted to the special context of corpo-
rate litigation, leaving gaps in coverage and, because they seemed to 
clash with public policy objectives, raising issues of enforceability.47  
The troubling public policy question was whether a corporation could 
insure its managers against losses for which they could not be legally 
indemnified.48  Although commentators had argued that insurance 
payments should not be allowed in any circumstance where indemni-
fication was illegal,49 state legislators ultimately mooted the argument 
46 See Joseph F. Johnston, Jr., Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Di-
rectors and Officers, 33 BUS. LAW. 1993, 2012 (1978) (“Although [D&O] policies have 
been marketed since the 1950s, the coverage had little attention until the mid-1960s.”); 
see also Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., New Cure for an Old Ailment:  Insurance Against Directors’ 
and Officers’ Liability, 22 BUS. LAW. 92, 103 (1966) (noting that the author had written 
four years earlier that directors and officers “do not commonly insure themselves 
against the expenses of litigation arising out of their corporate status,” but that since 
that time insurers had found a highly receptive market for D&O insurance, represent-
ing “a violent new twist” on the problem of the propriety of indemnification payments 
(citing GEORGE THOMAS WASHINGTON & JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP, JR., INDEMNIFYING 
THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 75 (1963))). 
47 Professor Bishop quipped: 
Perusal of the Lloyd’s form and its American imitations leaves me with a dis-
tinct impression that the draughtsman, though possessed of broad and solid 
experience in the field of insurance law, got his corporation law from some 
rather sketchy recollections of Business Units I (or whatever they happened to 
call the basic corporation course in his law school) and a quick glance at Cor-
pus Juris.  
Bishop, supra note 46, at 103. 
48 See id. at 106-07 (questioning whether corporations could, for example, indem-
nify directors from liability predicated on self-dealing).  Corporate indemnification of 
directors and officers is broadly permitted under the law of most states.  See infra note 
58 (noting the few situations in which indemnification is not legally permitted). 
49 See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 46, at 107 (“[W]here the applicable statute flatly 
prohibits indemnification inconsistent with its terms, it seems to me plainly illegal for 
the corporation to pay for insurance against expenses, such as payments to the corpo-
ration to compensate it for a breach of duty to it . . . .”); id. at 109-10 (arguing that be-
cause “courts would never allow a corporation to indemnify an insider against amounts 
paid the corporation in settlement or satisfaction of judgment” of a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty, the same criteria should be applied “to the corporation’s payment for 
insurance which may operate to relieve the insider of such liability”); see also Joseph W. 
Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks:  New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate 
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1087 (1968) (arguing that “an insurance policy 
paid for by the corporation whose effect was to free corporate managers from the fear 
of civil liability for breach of their duty to show good faith in their dealings with the 
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by passing statutes that expressly allowed corporations to purchase 
and maintain D&O insurance, even against those losses that the cor-
poration could not itself indemnify.50
D&O insurance thus operates as a contractual mechanism to 
spread the risk of shareholder litigation.  It moves the risk from indi-
vidual directors and officers to the corporation they manage and then 
to a third-party insurer, with the ultimate result that individual man-
agers are almost never saddled with personal liability for causing cor-
porate losses.51  If the shareholders sue, the corporation or its insurer 
pays.  This Part offers a close examination of this insurance arrange-
ment. 
A.  How D&O Insurance Works 
The general label “D&O insurance” is often applied to three dis-
tinct insurance arrangements.  First, there is coverage to protect indi-
vidual managers from the risk of shareholder litigation.  Second, there 
corporation” would violate public policy); Note, Indemnification of Directors:  The Problems 
Posed by Federal Securities and Antitrust Legislation, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1428 (1963) 
(“Insurance in its present form should be voided as contrary to public policy wherever 
it would free the director from a liability burden from which he could not be freed by 
indemnification.”); Note, Public Policy and Directors’ Liability Insurance, 67 COLUM. L. 
REV. 716, 719 (1967) (arguing that insurance against breach of the duty of loyalty is 
contrary to public policy, even if paid by the director herself). 
50 For example, Delaware law provides: 
A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf 
of any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the cor-
poration . . . against any liability asserted against such person and incurred by 
such person in any such capacity, or arising out of such person’s status as 
such, whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify such 
person against such liability under this section. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (2004); see also JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP, JR., THE LAW 
OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS:  INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 8.01 
(rev. ed. 1998) (“All states authorize the corporation to purchase and maintain insur-
ance on behalf of directors or officers against liabilities incurred in such capacities, 
whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify against such liabili-
ties.”). 
51 See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability 5 ( John M. Olin Program in Law 
& Econ., Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No. 250, 2003), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=382422 (noting the extremely low risk of director liability).  Recent 
settlements involving WorldCom and Enron compel the “almost” qualification.  See 
Gretchen Morgenson, Ex-Directors at WorldCom Settle Anew, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at 
C1 (describing an agreement in which former WorldCom directors will personally con-
tribute $20 million to a settlement).  On the difficulties of reaching personal assets 
rather than insurance assets in the ordinary tort context, see Tom Baker, Blood Money, 
New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 277 
(2001). 
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is coverage to reimburse the corporation for its indemnification obli-
gations.  And third, there is coverage to protect the corporation from 
the risk of shareholder litigation to which the corporate entity itself is 
a party.  The first two aspects of D&O coverage trace to the original 
Lloyd’s of London D&O form.52  The third form of coverage is a 
newer development.  A D&O insurance package may consist of these 
forms of coverage in any proportion. 
The only form of D&O insurance that actually insures individual 
directors and officers is referred to within the industry as “Side A cov-
erage.”53  Side A coverage essentially provides that the insurer will pay 
covered losses on behalf of covered managers when the corporation 
itself does not indemnify them.54  Covered losses include compensa-
tory damages, settlement amounts, and legal fees incurred by the in-
dividual in connection with her service as a director or officer of the 
corporation.55
 
 
 
52 The original Lloyd’s form contained two policies, “ALS(D4)” and “ALS(D5),” 
one for individual coverage and one for corporate coverage.  Joseph Hinsey, IV, et al., 
What Existing D&O Policies Cover, 27 BUS. LAW. 147, 150 (1972). 
53 The types of coverage are named in reference to the insurance documents list-
ing the respective rights and obligations.  Side A coverage relates to “Insuring Agree-
ment A,” Side B coverage to “Insuring Agreement B,” and so on. 
54 Typical policy language provides: 
Except for Loss which the Insurer pays pursuant to Insuring Agreement (B) of 
this Policy, the Insurer will pay on behalf of the Directors and Officers Loss 
which the Directors and Officers shall become legally obligated to pay as a re-
sult of a Claim first made during the Policy Period or Discovery Period, if ap-
plicable, against the Directors and Officers for a Wrongful Act which takes 
place during or prior to the Policy Period.  
Hartford Specimen Policy, supra note 6, § I(A); see also AIG Specimen Policy, supra 
note 6, § 1 (providing similar language); Chubb Specimen Policy, supra note 6, at 2 
(same).  The effect of the carve-out for losses paid pursuant to Insuring Agreement B 
is to prevent the managers from being paid twice for the same loss. 
55 AIG Specimen Policy, supra note 6, § 2(p); Chubb Specimen Policy, supra note 
6, at 5; Hartford Specimen Policy, supra note 6, § IV(J).  The policies define “claims” as 
the receipt of a written demand for relief, the filing of a civil proceeding, or the com-
mencement of a formal administrative or regulatory proceeding.  AIG Specimen Pol-
icy, supra note 6, § 2(b); Chubb Specimen Policy, supra note 6, at 3-4; Hartford Speci-
men Policy, supra note 6, § IV(A).  Wrongful acts include errors, misstatements, 
omissions, and breaches of duty committed by directors and officers in their official 
capacities as well as any other claim against the directors and officers solely by reason 
of their position.  AIG Specimen Policy, supra note 6, § 2(z)(1); Chubb Specimen Pol-
icy, supra note 6, at 7; Hartford Specimen Policy, supra note 6, § IV(O). 
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The second form of D&O coverage, “Side B coverage,” does not 
protect individual managers at all but rather reimburses the corpora-
tion for indemnifying its directors and officers.56  Payments under 
Side B coverage are thus triggered when the corporation incurs an ob-
ligation to indemnify its managers, which most policies deem to be 
required in every case where a corporation is legally permitted to do 
so.57  Together, Side A and Side B coverage allocate the risk of loss 
from shareholder litigation as follows.  First, when a company is legally 
permitted to indemnify its managers for their liabilities, as it generally 
is, it must do so.58  Second, when a company does indemnify its man-
56 Typical policy language provides: 
The Insurer will pay on behalf of the Company Losses for which the Company 
has, to the extent permitted or required by law, indemnified the Directors and 
Officers, and which the Directors and Officers have become legally obligated 
to pay as a result of a Claim . . . against the Directors and Officers for a 
Wrongful Act . . . . 
Hartford Specimen Policy, supra note 6, § I(B); see also AIG Specimen Policy, supra note 
6, § 1 (providing similar language); Chubb Specimen Policy, supra note 6, at 2 (same). 
57 See Hartford Specimen Policy, supra note 6, § VI(F) (providing that if a corpora-
tion is legally permitted to indemnify its officers and directors, its organizational 
documents will be deemed to require it to do so); see also AIG Specimen Policy, supra 
note 6, § 6 (same); Chubb Specimen Policy, supra note 6, at 11 (same).  When a corpo-
ration that is legally able to indemnify its directors and officers refuses to do so, the 
insurer remains obligated under the policy’s Side A coverage, but the obligation is sub-
ject to the (higher) Side B retention as well as a coinsurance percentage.  AIG Speci-
men Policy, supra note 6, § 6; Chubb Specimen Policy, supra note 6, at 12; Hartford 
Specimen Policy, supra note 6, § VI(F).  This presumptive indemnification aspect of 
the D&O policy is aimed at preventing the possibility of opportunism, where a corpo-
ration refuses to indemnify solely to cause the payment obligation to fall on the in-
surer. 
58 Although most state corporate law codes broadly permit indemnification, many 
states, including Delaware, do not allow indemnification for settlements (or judg-
ments) in derivative litigation on the theory that such awards benefit the company and 
are paid, minus the chunk awarded to the plaintiffs’ attorneys, into the corporate 
treasury.  See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2004) (permitting indemnification for 
expenses, judgments, and settlements for actions except those “by or in the right of the 
corporation”).  Because derivative litigation is asserted by shareholders in the corpora-
tion’s name, it is an action “by or in the right of the corporation.”  To allow indemnifi-
cation in such situations would be circular:  the director would pay the settlement to 
the corporation only to be given back the same amount by the corporation as indemni-
fication.  See Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnifi-
cation and Liability Insurance:  An Overview of Legal and Practical Issues, 51 BUS. LAW. 573, 
580 (1996) (“The theory is that the corporation would be indemnifying the director or 
officer for a settlement ultimately paid to the corporation itself as plaintiff.  Certain 
state legislatures, including Delaware’s, have determined that such circularity of pay-
ment is unacceptable.”).  Delaware does, however, permit corporations to indemnify 
directors for defense costs incurred by directors and officers in reaching settlement or 
judgment.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (2004).  Finally, although the SEC has long 
maintained that indemnification for securities law claims is contrary to public policy, it 
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agers, the insurer will reimburse the company pursuant to the terms 
of its Side B coverage.59  Third, when a company is not legally permit-
ted to indemnify its directors and officers, as in the case of derivative 
suit settlements, the insurer will pay pursuant to the company’s Side A 
coverage.60
The result is that an insurer’s Side A coverage obligations are trig-
gered principally when liabilities arise from the settlement of deriva-
tive litigation or when the company is insolvent.  Otherwise, and in 
the vast majority of cases, the liability falls on the corporation in the 
form of an indemnification obligation to its managers.61  Side B cov-
erage then shifts this liability, albeit at a higher retention, to the third-
party insurer.  The basis for both forms of coverage, it is important to 
note, is a claim against the company’s managers.  Neither Side A nor 
Side B coverage is available to cover liabilities that the corporation it-
self may have to a party in any given action. 
Side C coverage emerged to fill this void.  Evolving first as a solu-
tion to the disputes between insurance companies and corporate de-
is firmly established that the settlement of federal securities law claims may be indem-
nified.  See Raychem Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170, 1178 (N.D. Cal. 1994) 
(holding that the indemnification of federal securities claims was lawful). 
59 Side B coverage has higher retentions than Side A coverage, which may have no 
retention at all.  See, e.g., AIG Specimen Policy, supra note 6, § 6; Chubb Specimen Pol-
icy, supra note 6, at 12; Hartford Specimen Policy, supra note 6, § VI(F); Hartford Fin. 
Prods., Directors, Officers and Company Liability Policy Declarations ( June 2005), 
http://www.hfpinsurance.com/forms/na00h002.pdf [hereinafter Hartford Declara-
tions Page] (providing for higher retentions under Side B than under Side A); see also 
TILLINGHAST 2004 SURVEY, supra note 6, at 46 (reporting that 98% of U.S. respondents 
who purchased D&O insurance had no deductible associated with their Side A cover-
age). 
60 A slight wrinkle arises when a corporation’s legal ability to indemnify diverges 
from its financial capacity to do so.  Most policies resolve this issue by creating a “fi-
nancial insolvency” exception to the presumptive indemnification provision which re-
quires the insurer to reimburse individual managers under Side A of the policy when 
the corporation is financially unable to indemnify them.  See, e.g.,  Hartford Specimen 
Policy, supra note 6, § VI(F) (providing the financial insolvency exception); id. § IV(G) 
(defining financial insolvency as the status resulting from the appointment of a re-
ceiver, liquidator, or trustee to supervise or liquidate the company or the company be-
coming a debtor in possession); see also AIG Specimen Policy, supra note 6, § 19 (pro-
viding for coverage in the event of bankruptcy or insolvency); Chubb Specimen Policy, 
supra note 6, at 12 (providing the financial impairment exception); id. at 2 (defining 
financial impairment).  These provisions allow managers of insolvent firms to collect 
insurance proceeds without becoming subject to the higher retention amounts and 
coinsurance payments required when a corporation otherwise refuses to indemnify. 
61 See Dan A. Bailey, Side-A Only Coverage 4 (Feb. 11, 2004), http://www. 
baileycavalieri.com/CM/Articles/bc-SECTION_II_OF_365747.pdf  (“[T]he vast major-
ity of Claims covered under a D&O Policy are indemnified by the Company . . . .”). 
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fendants over what portion of a securities settlement ought to be allo-
cated to the managers (and therefore reimbursed by the insurer un-
der the corporation’s Side B coverage) and what portion allocated to 
the corporation (and therefore uncovered and paid directly by the 
corporation),62 Side C coverage moots the allocation issue by insuring 
the corporation itself against direct claims.63  Typical policy language 
provides:  “[T]he Insurer will pay on behalf of the Company Loss 
which the Company shall become legally obligated to pay as a result of 
a Securities Claim . . . against the Company for a Wrongful Act . . . .”64
To ensure that the company retains some “skin in the game” at 
settlement, insurers may insist on a higher retention amount for Side 
C claims as well as a significant coinsurance percentage.65  Still, Side C 
62 See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 64 F.3d 
1282, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying the “larger settlement rule,” which entitles the 
corporation to reimbursement of all settlement costs where the corporation’s liability 
is purely derivative of the liability of insured officers and directors); Nordstrom, Inc. v. 
Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1431-36 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling that where the cor-
poration had no liability except that derived from its officers and directors, the D&O 
insurer had no right to allocate discovery costs to the corporation); First Fidelity Ban-
corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No. 90-1866, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3977, at *38 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1994) (“[B]oth the directors and officers as well as the 
corporate entity faced liability in the underlying litigation.  The mere fact that liability 
arises exclusively from the conduct of the insured does not provide a basis for the in-
surer to be responsible for the liability of those who are uninsured.” (footnote omit-
ted)); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 640 F. Supp. 656, 661-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (ad-
dressing the issue of allocation between covered and noncovered parties and holding 
that the insurer bore the burden of proving that the ultimate allocation was reasonable 
in light of the “relative exposures” of the parties); see also Joseph P. Monteleone et al., 
Allocation of Defense Costs and Settlements Under D&O Policies, INSIGHTS, Nov. 1991, at 19, 
24 (concluding that negotiation is a better alternative to costly and lengthy adjudica-
tion of allocation issues). 
63 See Monteleone & Conca, supra note 58, at 618-20 (discussing predetermined 
allocation agreements and entity coverage as responses to allocation disputes). 
64 Hartford Specimen Policy, supra note 6, § I(C); see also AIG Specimen Policy, 
supra note 6, § 1 (using similar language); Chubb Specimen Policy, supra note 6, at 2 
(same).  A securities claim is defined in the policy to include claims by securities hold-
ers alleging a violation of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, or rules or regulations promulgated pursuant to either Act, as well as claims al-
leging violations of similar state laws and regulations, and includes claims “aris[ing] 
from the purchase or sale of, or offer to purchase or sell, any Securities issued by the 
Company” regardless of whether the transaction is with the company or over the open 
market.  Hartford Specimen Policy, supra note 6, § IV(M); see also AIG Specimen Pol-
icy, supra note 6, § 2(x) (providing a similar definition); Chubb Specimen Policy, supra 
note 6, at 6 (same).  If the company purchases Side C coverage, the definitions of 
“claim,” “loss,” and “wrongful act” expand to include the company and not just the di-
rectors and officers.  See, e.g., Hartford Specimen Policy § IV(A), ( J), (O)(1). 
65 See Hartford Declarations Page, supra note 59, at 1 (providing for separate re-
tention amounts for Side A, B, and C coverage); id. at 2 (providing for coinsurance 
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coverage is the final step in the process of shifting the cost of share-
holder litigation to a third-party insurer. 
Although each of these arrangements—Side A, B, and C cover-
age—may be referred to generally as D&O insurance, the collective 
label may be misleading since only Side A coverage insures the direc-
tors and officers.  Side B and Side C coverages are for the corporation.  
Nevertheless, referring to the arrangement as a whole as D&O insur-
ance underscores the broader point that corporations buy insurance 
packages.  Pure Side A (or B or C) coverage is rare.  Coverage types are 
mixed to achieve the distinct insurance goals of (1) protecting man-
agers from personal liability for shareholder litigation; (2) protecting 
the company from indirect liability, through its indemnification obli-
gations, for shareholder litigation; and (3) protecting the company 
from direct liability from securities litigation.  What all of these goals 
have in common, however, is the shifting of risk from shareholder liti-
gation, in whole or in part, from the corporation to a third-party in-
surer. 
B.  Why Corporations Buy D&O Insurance 
The vast majority of American public companies—a proportion 
consistently reported at well over 90%—buy D&O insurance.66  This 
presents a puzzle.  Insurance, after all, is not free.  Insurance premi-
ums reflect not only the policy’s risk—an actuarially determined 
probability of loss—but also a loading fee reflecting the insurer’s costs 
and profits.67  This means that it always costs more to buy insurance 
for a risk than to bear it oneself.68  Moreover, unlike individuals, for 
percentages for nonsecurities claims); see also Am. Int’l Group (AIG), Side-A Excess 
and DIC Executive Liability Insurance Policy Declarations § 4 (Apr. 2003),  http:// 
www.aignationalunion.com/nationalunion/public/natfiledownload/0,2138,1894,00.pdf? 
[hereinafter AIG Declarations Page] (providing similar policy terms). 
66 See TILLINGHAST 2004 SURVEY, supra note 6, at 21 fig.12 (showing that since 
1997, 90% or more of U.S. respondents have purchased D&O insurance, with 99% of 
U.S. respondents purchasing coverage in 2004). 
67 K. BORCH, ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE 13-15, 163 (Knut K. Aase & Agnar 
Sandmo eds., 1990) (describing the insurance premium as the sum of the expected 
claim payment under the insurance contract, the administrative expenses of the insur-
ance company, and the reward to the insurer for bearing the risk, and later referring 
to the difference between expected claims payments and the insurance premium as 
the “loading” of the contract). 
68 As a result, individuals ought to purchase insurance only against large potential 
losses that, if incurred, would significantly diminish their quality of life and not against 
small losses—through extended consumer warranties, for example—that one could 
easily bear oneself.  See ROBERT I. MEHR & EMERSON CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSUR-
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whom third-party insurance may be the only available means of 
spreading risk, corporations are themselves sophisticated risk-shifting 
mechanisms, ultimately allocating the risk of business failure to share-
holders whose losses, thanks to limited liability, cannot exceed the ex-
tent of their investment.  Furthermore, because shareholders can 
spread this risk costlessly (or nearly so) by holding a diversified portfo-
lio of stocks, it is a puzzle why corporations buy insurance at all.  Why 
would corporations pay extra for something that their shareholders 
can get for free in the capital markets? 
For basic property and casualty insurance, economists have largely 
answered this question.69  First, features of the tax code, including the 
availability of deductions for insurance premiums but not for internal 
reserves,70 create incentives for corporations to purchase insurance 
rather than to self-insure.71  In addition, because transaction costs in 
bankruptcy are often high,72 creditors and shareholders alike may pre-
fer that the corporation purchase insurance against large potential 
losses in order to keep the firm out of bankruptcy.73  Creditors may 
ANCE 35 (6th ed. 1976) (“Insurance for small losses which can be absorbed is uneco-
nomical because the insurance premium includes not only the loss cost but also an ex-
pense margin.”). 
69 Professors Mayers and Smith addressed this puzzle in a series of articles.  See 
David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for Insurance:  Evidence 
from the Reinsurance Market, 63 J. BUS. 19 (1990) (using data from the reinsurance in-
dustry, where insurance purchases are systematically reported, to see the effects of 
ownership structure, geographic concentration, and line-of-business concentration on 
the demand for reinsurance); David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Corporate Insurance 
and the Underinvestment Problem, 54 J. RISK & INS. 45 (1987) (describing an incentive 
conflict between bondholders and shareholders and using insurance to solve the prob-
lem); David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, 55 J. 
BUS. 281 (1982) [hereinafter Mayers & Smith, Demand] (analyzing corporate incen-
tives to purchase insurance policies in accordance with the modern theory of finance).  
For further discussion, see Richard MacMinn & James Garven, On Corporate Insurance, 
in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 541 (Georges Dionne ed., 2000). 
70 See 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2000) (allowing, generally, deductions for “business ex-
penses”); Carnation Co. v. Comm’r, 640 F.2d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 1981) (disallowing a 
business expense deduction for amounts set aside for self-insurance); Rev. Rul. 69-491, 
1969-2 C.B. 22 (ruling that insurance premiums for D&O insurance are deductible 
business expenses). 
71 See MacMinn & Garven, supra note 69, at 557-60 (describing and modeling tax 
incentives for corporate insurance purchases); Mayers & Smith, Demand, supra note 69, 
at 289-91, 294-95 (same). 
72 See Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs:  Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337, 338-39 
(1977) (describing direct and indirect transaction costs of bankruptcy). 
73 See MacMinn & Garven, supra note 69, at 548-50 (noting the impact of bank-
ruptcy as an incentive to insure); Mayers & Smith, Demand, supra note 69, at 284-85 
(describing the effect of transaction costs in bankruptcy on incentives to purchase in-
surance). 
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also insist that corporations insure major assets in order to protect the 
security of their loans.74  Some forms of property and casualty cover-
age may thus add value to the corporation. 
These explanations, however, do not apply with equal force to the 
purchase of D&O insurance.  Although there still may be some tax ad-
vantage to buying insurance over reserving, such advantage shrinks 
with the size of coverage.  Because D&O policies and premiums are 
smaller than standard corporate property and casualty coverages, the 
relevant tax deductions as well as the costs associated with creating 
self-insurance reserves are also smaller.75  Similarly, because likely 
D&O losses are a fraction of potential losses under a standard corpo-
rate property and casualty policy, they pose less of a bankruptcy 
threat.  Finally, there is no evidence that creditors insist on D&O in-
surance as a condition for making corporate loans.  All of this suggests 
that the corporate benefits from the purchase of D&O insurance are 
considerably smaller than the corporate benefits from the purchase of 
basic property and casualty insurance.  Worse, the effect of removing 
the threat of personal liability from those persons most able to keep 
the corporation from incurring liability for shareholder litigation 
raises the specter of moral hazard, an additional cost of D&O insur-
ance that may outweigh the shrinking benefits to the corporation.76
Still, at least one aspect of the corporate purchase of D&O insur-
ance is easy to explain.  Recall that D&O insurance has two parts—
Side A, benefiting individual managers, and Side B and Side C, bene-
74 See MacMinn & Garven, supra note 69, at 550-57 (modeling corporate insurance 
as a means to mitigate agency problems between corporate managers and bondhold-
ers); Mayers & Smith, Demand, supra note 69, at 287 (“Bond indentures frequently con-
tain covenants requiring the firm to maintain certain types of insurance coverage.”). 
75 The general property and casualty market is much larger than the D&O market.  
One source estimates the total size of the D&O market (primary and excess) at ap-
proximately $705 million in 2004, while another source estimates the total size of the 
general corporate property and casualty market (commercial multiple peril lines) at 
over $27 billion in 2003.  Compare TILLINGHAST 2004 SURVEY, supra note 6, at 64 tbl.50 
(estimating the primary D&O market at $312,457,586), and id. at 71 tbl.54 (estimating 
the excess D&O market at $391,882,895), with A.M. BEST CO., BEST’S AGGREGATES & 
AVERAGES:  PROPERTY/CASUALTY, UNITED STATES & CANADA 351 (2004) (aggregating 
commercial multiple peril net premiums underwritten at $27,359,792,000).  Clearly, 
general property and casualty lines are much larger than D&O lines.  However, it is 
difficult to generate comparisons since state insurance commissioners do not require 
D&O results to be disclosed as a separate line item in insurers’ filings.  As a result, A.M. 
Best cannot provide aggregate statistics for D&O lines as they do for other separately 
reported insurance lines, and D&O results must be estimated from other sources. 
76 See generally BAKER, supra note 4, at 4-5 (discussing the moral hazard of insur-
ance, which reduces incentives to “protect against loss or minimize the cost of a loss”). 
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fiting the corporation itself.  Because Side A coverage protects indi-
viduals, it can be justified on the basis of individual risk aversion.77  
Corporate managers insist on D&O insurance to protect their per-
sonal wealth from the risk of shareholder litigation, making such cov-
erage necessary to attract qualified persons to board service and ex-
ecutive-level employment.78  Side A coverage is thus explained as an 
aspect of the individual’s compensation package, a cost that the labor 
market has allocated to the employer.79  However, this is not a com-
plete explanation for D&O insurance.  It does not explain why corpo-
rations also purchase coverage, under Side B and Side C of the policy, 
for the corporation itself. 
Indeed, entity-level coverage for the risk of shareholder litigation 
is particularly puzzling since the corporation controls the governance 
processes that create litigation risk.  Because corporations can miti-
gate this litigation risk by improving their governance practices and 
shareholders can eliminate the risk of business failure by holding a di-
versified portfolio, the party in the best position to bear the risk of 
shareholder litigation would seem to be the corporation itself.80  
Moreover, once the loading fees associated with D&O insurance are 
taken into account, the costs of entity-level coverage appear to out-
weigh the benefits.  Entity-level D&O insurance, in other words, ap-
pears to be a negative net present value investment.  Why, then, do 
corporations buy it? 
77 See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 207-09 
(17th ed. 2001) (describing risk aversion and its relationship to the diminishing mar-
ginal utility of income). 
78 Participants in the insurance market cite this as the basic explanation for D&O 
insurance.  See, e.g., Randy Parr, Directors and Officers Insurance, in D&O LIABILITY & IN-
SURANCE 2004:  DIRECTORS & OFFICERS UNDER FIRE 13, 13 (PLI Commercial Law & 
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. A-865, 2004) (“[I]t is difficult for corporations 
to attract and keep outside directors.”). 
79 Coverage for individual directors and officers was recognized as an aspect of 
compensation early in the evolution of D&O insurance.  See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 
46, at 2013 (stating that the fact that the corporation paid D&O premiums “was noth-
ing more than another form of compensation for the executives and way of attracting 
capable managers”).  Interestingly, the first D&O policies allocated a portion of the 
premium, usually 10%, to the individual insured.  See Stanley L. Wallace, More on Sitting 
Ducks: (Officers and Directors, That Is), INSURANCE, Apr. 16, 1966, at 32, 36 (describing  
the then-typical “ratio of 90% of the premium to the corporation and 10% to the offi-
cers and directors”).  This aspect of the policy has been discontinued, presumably be-
cause individual directors and officers asked for and received corporate payment of 
the full premium. 
80 Although D&O insurance may guarantee a recovery ex post for shareholders 
who sue a bankrupt or insolvent firm, ex ante shareholders could more efficiently 
manage the risk of corporate bankruptcy by holding a diversified portfolio of shares. 
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If the purchase of entity-level D&O insurance is not a sensible in-
vestment for the firm, it may nevertheless serve the interests of the 
firm’s managers.  Managers, unlike diversified shareholders, have a 
significant personal stake in the firm they manage, and therefore a 
greater personal incentive to avoid corporate-level losses.81  Even if 
losses are unlikely to lead to insolvency (and manager unemploy-
ment), they may still impact corporate assets and earnings, drawing 
unwelcome scrutiny from the capital markets, perhaps including a 
challenge to the management of the firm.82
More directly, managers may use corporate funds to purchase en-
tity-level D&O coverage because management compensation packages 
are tied to accounting measures of performance and because share-
holder litigation is likely to have an adverse impact on these meas-
ures.83  Entity-level D&O insurance allows managers to avoid shocks to 
the firm’s accounting statements.84  By buying D&O insurance, man-
agers essentially trade large but infrequent expected losses for smaller 
81 As a general matter, this incentive arrangement benefits shareholders by miti-
gating agency costs.  In this one instance, however, because using D&O insurance to 
avoid corporate-level losses appears to be a negative net present value investment, 
shareholder and manager interests are not aligned. 
82 The challenge may be in the form of a proxy fight or an unwanted takeover bid.  
See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Man-
agement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1161-62 (1981) (arguing 
that resistance by managers to premium tender offers decreases shareholder welfare); 
Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations:  The Case Against Defensive Tactics 
in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 820 (1981) (arguing that Delaware corporation 
law does not successfully resolve the conflict between managers’ and shareholders’ in-
terests in the tender offer context); Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market 
for Corporate Control:  The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 6 (1983) (positing that 
“the takeover market is an important component of the managerial labor market” 
through which “alternative managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corpo-
rate resources”); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110, 112 (1965) (describing the role of management inefficiency and low share 
prices in triggering takeover bids).  Significant reductions in earnings or assets may 
also result in a credit downgrade.  See generally Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agen-
cies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 79 (2004) (describing how credit ratings work and what they 
signal to the market). 
83 Cf. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:  THE UNFUL-
FILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 121-74 (2004) (detailing defects in the 
design of executive compensation packages that lead to similarly distorted incentives). 
84 In addition, a positive externality of this system (from the managers’ point of 
view) may be that shareholder litigation becomes a less noteworthy event since it is 
handled almost exclusively by the third-party insurer and rarely threatens the corpora-
tion itself.  This would not be the case if corporations had to fund their own defense 
and had their own assets at risk, which would presumably cause shareholders to pay 
closer attention each time a shareholder claim arose. 
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annual costs in order to reduce the volatility of corporate earnings.85  
Entity-level coverage, in other words, is a form of earnings manage-
ment.  Managers buy it to protect their compensation in spite of the 
fact that it may often be a negative net present value investment for 
the corporation.  In this way, entity-level D&O coverage is a paradig-
matic example of agency costs—the dislocation between shareholder 
and manager incentives.86
Why, then, do corporations buy D&O insurance?  The answer to 
this question, it seems, has two parts.  First, corporations buy Side A 
coverage in order to attract risk-averse individuals to their boardrooms 
and executive suites.  The second part of the answer is more complex 
and, perhaps, more sinister:  Corporations buy entity-level coverage 
under Side B and Side C of the D&O policy because they are run by 
selfish managers who are willing to invest corporate assets in negative 
net present value projects in order to protect their own compensation 
packages. 
IV.  D&O INSURANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Once corporations buy D&O insurance, regardless ultimately of 
why they do, the risk of shareholder litigation shifts, in whole or in 
part, to a third-party insurer.  The insurer thus subjects its capital re-
serves to risks determined, at least in part, by the insured’s corporate 
governance.87  This Part explores the implications of this transfer of 
risk. 
85 See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 16, at 1 (reporting that the mean securities set-
tlement in 2004 was $27.1 million, while the median settlement was $5.3 million). 
86 Accord John M.R. Chalmers et al., Managerial Opportunism?  Evidence from Directors’ 
and Officers’ Insurance Purchases, 57 J. FIN. 609, 610-11 (2002) (investigating whether 
managers buy high-priced D&O coverage because they receive all of the benefits of the 
coverage but bear slight costs and finding that “managers choos[e] abnormally high 
D&O insurance coverage based on their belief that their shares are priced too high”); 
John E. Core, On the Corporate Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, 64 J. RISK & 
INS. 63, 81 (1997) (investigating the hypothesis that more-entrenched managers are 
more likely to purchase D&O insurance and finding, in a sample of Canadian firms, 
that the “firms with higher excess director pay . . . are more likely to carry D&O insur-
ance coverage and purchase higher limits,” suggesting that managers bundle compen-
sation and insurance because they do not internalize the cost of either). 
87 See supra Part II (positing that insofar as corporate governance and shareholder 
litigation are related, D&O insurance risk should reflect the quality of the insured’s 
corporate governance). 
  
1174 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 1147 
 
A.  Pricing the Policy:   
Correlating Corporate Governance and D&O Liability Risk 
Insurance companies are experts at assessing risk.  Because the 
success of an insurer’s business depends upon taking in more capital 
than it pays out, the insurer must develop an ability to assess the prob-
able payout obligations of each exposure and then charge an appro-
priate premium for the risk.  Just as providers of auto insurance must 
assess the likelihood that a particular driver will cause an accident, a 
D&O underwriter must determine the likelihood that a particular 
management team will incur shareholder litigation.  D&O underwrit-
ers therefore ought to develop categories of high risk corporate gov-
ernance and low risk corporate governance and, in a well-working in-
surance market, seek to price and sell their policies at least partly on 
that basis.88
Insurers may assess a prospective insured’s governance risk at the 
time the D&O policy is first underwritten and then on an ongoing ba-
sis, at each annual renewal.  Each year the underwriter has the option 
of refusing to renew a policy or of increasing a premium in response 
to new information about a firm’s governance risk.  Similarly, because 
D&O policies are bought and sold in competitive markets, prospective 
insureds have an opportunity to shop for the most comprehensive and 
least expensive coverage.89  Each party to the insurance arrangement 
is thus constrained by competition:  a company with very poor corpo-
rate governance may be unable to find a willing underwriter, and an 
underwriter that prices its coverage very high may be unable to find 
customers for its policies. 
88 Market failure in the insurance market, of course, could disrupt the connection 
between corporate governance and policy pricing.  Insurance industry cycles—between 
hard and soft markets—are sometimes taken as evidence of market failure.  See infra 
note 151 and accompanying text (describing insurance market cycles).  Cyclicality 
alone, however, does not disrupt the connection between governance and pricing 
since all insurers enter soft and hard markets together.  As a result, although their ra-
tios of premium to loss may change (rising in a hard market and falling in a soft mar-
ket), insurers retain incentives across markets not to write coverage below cost.  See 
Lynna Goch, Falling Markets, Rising Risks, BEST’S REVIEW, May 2001, at 55, 56 (“Market 
conditions, type of risk, industry and terms of the policy . . . affect [D&O] pricing.”); 
Lisa S. Howard, European D&O Insurance Carriers Swearing Off “Drive-By” Underwriting, 
NAT’L UNDERWRITER, Dec. 2, 2002, at 20, 20 (“[U]nderwriters are . . . digging deep to 
really analyze a company, its board structure, who the people are and what their his-
tory is, what business they’re in, and how they conduct their business.”). 
89 Chubb and AIG are the leading primary underwriters in the U.S. market, to-
gether accounting for over 36% of all policies and 47% of premium volume in 2003.  
TILLINGHAST 2004 SURVEY, supra note 6, at 63 tbl.50. 
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The policy application is the first step in the underwriting process 
and the insurer’s most basic tool for collecting information on a pro-
spective insured.90  Application forms are required of both new and 
renewal applicants, but the questions asked of each differ.  New appli-
cants are asked whether they or any subsidiary corporation has previ-
ously held a D&O policy and, if so, they are asked for further details 
concerning the identity of the prior insurer, the previous policy’s limit 
and deductible, and the policy premium.91  This information may al-
low the underwriter to make an initial assessment of the prospective 
insured, using the reputation of the prior insurer to judge the overall 
acceptability of the risk profile and the previous policy’s limits, de-
ductible, and premium as a proxy for the prior insurer’s ultimate as-
sessment of the risk.  The application form also asks new applicants 
about prior claims experience and whether any covered person has 
knowledge of acts or omissions that may give rise to a claim.92  Both 
new and renewal applicants are asked about recent or planned corpo-
rate restructurings, including acquisitions, reorganizations, and sales 
or distributions of businesses as well as any plans to register an offer-
ing of securities.93  New and renewal applicants are also asked to at-
tach a list identifying all directors and officers, the company’s most re-
cent annual report, proxy notices, securities law filings, and the 
company’s most recent interim financial statements.94  The apparent 
purpose of these documents is to enable the underwriter to perform 
due diligence on the insured, but perhaps as importantly, these 
documents become incorporated into the application, which becomes 
the basis of the policy and, if the documents contain a material mis-
statement or omission, a possible grounds for rescission.95  This fea-
90 See E-mail from Confidential Source, Executive, Major D&O Underwriter, to au-
thor (Feb. 16, 2005) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) [herein-
after D&O Underwriter E-mail] (“[C]ompletion of the application typically begins the 
process and precedes any meetings between the prospective insured and the under-
writers.”). 
91 See, e.g., Hartford Fin. Prods., Proposal for Directors, Officers, and Company 
Liability Insurance § 4(a) (Nov. 2003), http://www.hfpinsurance.com/apps/do09r288.pdf  
(requiring new applicants to furnish this information about their previous D&O in-
surer). 
92 Id. § 5. 
93 Id. § 4. 
94 Id. § 7. 
95 The Hartford Specimen Application provides in its boilerplate that “[a]ll writ-
ten statements and materials furnished to the insurer in conjunction with this proposal 
form are hereby incorporated by reference into this proposal and made a part hereof” 
and that “this proposal shall be the basis of the contract should a policy be issued.” 
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ture of the application binds a corporation to the credibility of all 
statements made in the application and in any documents supplied to 
the insurer in connection with the application.  A corporation defeats 
the purpose of buying insurance if it supplies false or misleading 
statements in connection with the application since such statements 
could be used by the insurer to deny coverage should a dispute later 
arise. 
In many cases, the information supplied in the policy application 
is supplemented by meetings during which the prospective insured 
makes presentations, described by participants as similar to an IPO 
road show,96 to prospective underwriters.97  These presentations show-
case, among other things, the prospective insured’s corporate govern-
ance.  One document I obtained from an insurance broker seeks to 
prepare clients for these presentations.98  The document highlights 
corporate governance and advises prospective insureds to discuss their 
auditing firm and disclose whether the company also purchases con-
sulting services from the same firm, essentially flagging a key corpo-
rate governance issue that arose in the wake of the Enron collapse.99  
The same document urges clients to emphasize any steps taken to im-
prove corporate governance, such as “[p]articipating [in] or complet-
ing any Corporate Governance workshops,” and lists key governance 
talking points, including the directors’ equity interest in the company, 
Id. at 4.  This language in the application is immediately followed by state-specific 
fraud warnings.  Id. 
96 See D&O Advisor Interview, supra note 6 (“Usually somewhere in the process, a 
company might essentially have to do an IPO-type road show and the underwriters 
would try to get a very good knowledge of the company . . . .”).  These meetings are 
organized by the company’s insurance broker and involve key company officials, typi-
cally the CFO and occasionally the CEO, and one or more insurance underwriters.  Id. 
97 See D&O Underwriter E-mail, supra note 90 (“In the case of a very large (e.g., 
Fortune 1000) risk with multiple layers of coverage being sought, there may be an in-
person meeting with the primary [insurer] and participation of excess insurers by tele-
conference.”). 
98 See Company Facts (unpublished industry document, on file with the University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review).  An introductory passage counsels: 
The purpose of this list is to highlight all the important facts that we want to 
be sure the underwriters know.  If we can include any of the below items in 
our discussions, we will have set the stage to deliver a risk profile that is desir-
able to the underwriting community.  
Id. 
99 Id.  On the problem of accounting firms providing nonaudit services to their 
audit clients and its role in the Enron collapse, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron 
Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation:  Some Initial Re-
flections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1237-39 (2002). 
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how directors are screened and chosen, and whether the corporation 
has separated the roles of board chair and chief executive officer.100
Another document prepared by a D&O broker to help clients 
prepare for these meetings lists “Examples of Questions Being Asked 
by D&O Underwriters” and counsels clients to prepare for specific 
questions involving related-party transactions,101 earnings manage-
ment,102 and takeover planning.103  In this document, the company is 
asked to consider how it responds to pressures to meet earnings tar-
gets and to address any company practices that might be criticized as 
“earnings management.”104  The questions also highlight general cor-
porate governance issues, including: 
How does “bad news” flow upward within the organization?  Does the 
corporate culture encourage such news to be brought to the attention of 
senior management? 
100 Company Facts, supra note 98.  Such terms have repeatedly arisen in recent dis-
cussions of corporate governance.  On their likely significance, see generally sources 
cited supra note 7. 
101 Examples of Questions Being Asked by D&O Underwriters (unpublished in-
dustry document, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).  Listed ques-
tions include: 
Does the Parent Company or any Subsidiary utilize any off balance sheet enti-
ties for financial transactions? 
Does any member of the Board of Directors have any outside affiliation or any 
common business interest with any major shareholder (10% or more)? 
Within the past three years, did the Parent Company or any Subsidiary engage 
in any related party transactions? 
Id. 
102 These questions include: 
Has the Parent Company changed auditors or restated its financials in the past 
three years? 
Please discuss the extent of the experience of the Audit Committee Members.  
How often do they meet?  Does the Internal Audit Function have a direct re-
port to the Audit Committee/Board of Directors? 
Has your external auditor approved revenue recognition practices? 
What is the length and scope of the company’s relationship with its outside 
auditors?  What percentage of fees has the company paid for auditing vs. con-
sultant fees?  Are there any planned changes to this mix going forward? 
How does management cope with pressure to meet “street” expectations? 
Where might the company be subject to criticism, if at all, for “earnings man-
agement”?  How strong are internal controls over the financial reporting proc-
ess? 
Id. 
103 See id. (“How does the company review potential mergers and acquisitions?”). 
104 Id. 
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Are significant developments shared with the Board of Directors as they 
become available? 
How does the company select a new member of the Board?  How does 
the search process take place?
105
All of these questions relate directly to the quality of a firm’s cor-
porate governance.  Earnings management and related-party transac-
tions may trigger securities litigation or derivative lawsuits, or both.106  
Similarly, a board’s takeover planning may indicate entrenchment 
and the possibility that shareholder suits will be brought in connec-
tion with acquisition activity.107  Perhaps most significant, however, is 
the question of intracorporate information flow.  Although not tied to 
a specific shareholder claim, answers to this question may indicate 
how potential problems are handled within the organization and then 
perhaps resolved before they give rise to shareholder litigation.  In 
this way, the underwriter appears to be looking for clues to the health 
of the organization that go beyond issues tied to specific governance 
terms or types of litigation. 
The underwriter’s access to corporate officials in these meetings 
allows it to assess the prospective insured’s corporate governance on 
the basis of information beyond that which is publicly available in the 
company’s securities filings or other public documents.  In addition to 
the completion of the policy application and oral answers to ques-
tions, prospective insureds may be asked to provide sensitive informa-
tion or confidential documents to enable the underwriter to complete 
its evaluation.  Such disclosures are typically made pursuant to non-
disclosure agreements (NDAs).108  Moreover, because the insurer is 
not an equity analyst or rating agency, the company has no obligation 
under SEC Regulation FD to disclose the information to the market as 
a whole and can, instead, keep the information confidential under the 
terms of the NDA.109  Unlike equity analysts, in other words, under-
105 Id. 
106 See Thompson & Sale, supra note 13, at 887-90 (discussing various forms of 
shareholder lawsuits arising from the same underlying conduct). 
107 See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 11, at 139 (discussing shareholder suits in 
the acquisition context). 
108 See E-mail from Confidential Source, Partner, Major New York Law Firm, to au-
thor (May 9, 2005) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) 
(“[A]pplications may contain certain confidential disclosures that may not be legally 
required to be disclosed publicly and may have been submitted to the insurer pursuant 
to a non-disclosure agreement.”). 
109 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2005) (preventing selective disclosure of material non-
public information). 
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writers can commit to keep any secrets their prospective insureds 
share with them, enabling the underwriters to base their assessments 
of prospective insureds on information that, because it is not publicly 
available, is not already reflected in share price.110
In addition to enjoying unique access to nonpublic information, 
insurers stake their own capital on their risk assessments and there-
fore have the optimal incentive to perform a careful analysis of gov-
ernance risk.  First, unlike other third-party evaluators of corporate 
governance, including equity analysts, Institutional Shareholder Ser-
vices, and ratings agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s,111 
all of which operate on a fee-for-services model and therefore do not 
suffer when a rating is incorrect, insurers stake their own capital on 
their governance assessments and suffer directly from any error in 
evaluating risk.112  Second, unlike mutual funds, pension funds, and 
other diversified equity investors, insurance companies cannot elimi-
nate the nonsystematic risk of firm-specific governance.  To be sure, 
insurers build portfolios of insureds, but insurance underwriting takes 
place in a competitive market and not every insurer receives a portion 
of every risk.  As a result, each insurer’s portfolio of insureds is differ-
ent, with insurers that are skilled at distinguishing good and bad risks 
predictably building better overall portfolios than those who are 
110 The semi-strong version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis requires in-
formation to be publicly available in order for it to be reflected in price.  See generally 
STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 319-35 (5th ed. 1999) (detailing the dif-
ferent versions of the efficient capital markets hypothesis). 
111 For a description of each of these organizations, see Inst’l S’holder Servs., 
About ISS, http://www.issproxy.com/about/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 25, 2006); 
Moody’s Investors Serv., About Moody’s, http://www.moodys.com (follow “About 
Moody’s” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 25, 2006); Standard & Poor’s, S&P About Us, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com (follow “About Us” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 25, 
2006). 
112 It is possible to argue that the reputation of a governance rating agency suffers 
when its assessment proves incorrect, leading to fewer customers for the service and 
therefore reduced revenues.  See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Mar-
kets:  The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (“Rating agencies are . . . mo-
tivated to provide accurate and efficient ratings because their profitability is directly 
tied to reputation.”).  However, the diminution in revenues due to a harm to reputa-
tion may be less immediate and less drastic than the insurer’s loss of capital as a result 
of a misestimation leading to an incurred loss.  Moreover, because their success is not 
tied directly to the ratings they generate, but to the organizations that hire and pay 
them, corporate governance rating agencies’ evaluations can be captured by other 
kinds of agendas—for example, either pro- or anti-regulatory—that do not necessarily 
correspond to accurate evaluations of governance risk. 
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not.113  Because diversified equity investors can eliminate these kinds 
of nonsystematic risk, there is less incentive for institutional investors 
to develop expertise in actively distinguishing good and bad risks.  
Third, unlike bondholders, who can control their downside risk 
through a combination of contract, security, and priority, insurers 
have no security interest and no system of priority to protect their 
rights if their risk assessments are ultimately wrong. 
Given the structure of their incentives and their unique access to 
information, one can expect insurers to develop expertise in distin-
guishing good and bad governance risks and to build these assess-
ments into their models for pricing D&O insurance.  And there is evi-
dence that they do.  In filings required by state insurance commissioners, 
underwriters disclose that they modify insurance rates for industry and 
ownership structure as well as items such as “relationship with con-
stituency groups” and “management experience.”114  Insurers thus do 
seem to attempt to relate D&O pricing to firm-specific governance at-
tributes.  The effect of these efforts across a well-working insurance 
market would seem to tie the amount a firm pays for its D&O insur-
ance to the quality of its corporate governance. 
This relationship has two significant implications.  First, it could 
cause corporations to improve their overall governance structure in 
order to reduce firm costs since worse governance leads to higher 
premiums.  This possibility is explored in Section B.  Second, even if 
corporations do not respond to differences in the cost of D&O insur-
ance pricing by optimizing their governance structure, the price that a 
firm pays for D&O insurance could convey an important signal to in-
vestors and other market participants.  This possibility is explored in 
Section C. 
113 This is the phenomenon of adverse selection, with insurers who are worse at 
screening governance risk building systematically worse risk pools than their competi-
tors who are better at it.  See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:  Qual-
ity Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-90 (1970) (providing 
the classic account of adverse selection from the example of a used car market). 
114 See Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., D&O Elite Directors & Officers Liability Insur-
ance Actuarial Memorandum, in Application for Approval of Insurance Rates exhibit 
23, at 2-7 (Cal. Dep’t of Ins. file no. EO CA0019310C01, filed Dec. 22, 2003) (reporting 
rate modifications to the base D&O premium for, among other things, industry, stabil-
ity of earnings, “board/management architecture and controls,” qualifications of indi-
vidual directors and officers, executive compensation, and litigation history). 
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B.  Incentive Effects 
Businesses can improve their earnings in two ways:  by increasing 
revenues or by cutting costs.  Insurance expenses, including D&O 
premiums, are a source of cost.  It follows, then, that corporations 
could improve their earnings by cutting them and, in order to create a 
competitive advantage, have an incentive to do so.  One way to cut in-
surance costs, of course, is not to buy coverage.  As discussed above, 
however, corporations tend to purchase coverage even if it is on the 
whole a negative net present value investment.115  Another way that 
corporations might try to manage insurance costs is to eliminate those 
governance features that lead to higher D&O premiums. 
Building upon the hypothesis that insurers charge different rates 
to companies with different corporate governance structures, D&O 
premiums might provide an incentive for corporations to improve 
corporate governance.  By continually optimizing its governance 
structure, a corporation ought to find that it pays consistently less for 
D&O insurance than its competitors.  Better corporate governance, in 
other words, would mean lower D&O insurance costs and, therefore, 
higher earnings and improved share values relative to competitors 
who have not also optimized their governance structure. 
One problem with this incentives story is that while D&O insur-
ance premiums are by no means small—the average total premium for 
U.S. companies with a market capitalization of over $10 billion was 
$5,126,213 in 2003116—they may not be large enough to spur large 
changes in corporate governance practices.  If, as seems to be the 
case, the D&O insurance premium has a relatively small overall effect 
on a corporation’s net income, the marginal costs of regularly review-
ing and revising internal governance policies—involving expensive le-
gal and financial advisors as well as the time and attention of the gen-
eral counsel and top level management—may easily outweigh the 
marginal benefits of savings in policy premiums. 
Also, insofar as the corporation’s reason for purchasing entity-
level coverage is based upon agency costs within the firm,117 it is rather 
quixotic to expect corporations to cut D&O expenses in order to in-
crease earnings.  It is always true that managers could make their cor-
porations run better by trimming agency costs.  Managers could im-
prove the bottom line by cutting their salaries, giving back their 
115 See supra Part III.B (discussing D&O insurance as an example of agency costs). 
116 TILLINGHAST 2004 SURVEY, supra note 6, at 57 tbl.45C. 
117 See supra Part III.B. 
  
1182 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 1147 
benefits packages, and firing their cronies.  But it is also true that they 
will be generally disinclined to do so.  In this way, just as it would not 
be surprising for D&O premiums to be higher for companies with bad 
managers, it would not be surprising for bad managers to refuse to be 
good in order to reduce an expense that is ultimately borne by the 
shareholders.  Any reduction in agency costs would be better for 
shareholders, but if bad managers are not willing to fix these prob-
lems generally, it is unlikely that the additional corporate expense of 
marginally higher D&O premiums would spur them to do so. 
In sum, in spite of the incentive effects of D&O premiums—
essentially, better-governed companies pay less—one ought not expect 
the insurance premium alone to push companies to adopt better cor-
porate governance.  The marginal costs of continually optimizing cor-
porate governance might not be worth the marginal benefit of re-
duced D&O premiums.  Moreover, to the extent that D&O insurance 
purchases correspond to agency costs, managers are unlikely to re-
duce their private benefits to save costs borne by shareholders. 
C.  Signaling Effects 
Even if the cost of D&O insurance does not provide a sufficiently 
strong incentive to spur a corporation to optimize its governance 
structure, a company’s D&O policy may nevertheless contain informa-
tion that would be valuable to capital market participants.  First, the 
type of insurance package purchased by a particular firm may convey 
information concerning the firm’s likely motives in purchasing it and, 
by extension, provide some gauge of the extent of agency costs within 
the organization.  Second, following the hypothesis that insurers de-
velop expertise in separating acceptable from unacceptable govern-
ance risks in order to charge appropriate premiums, the price of a 
firm’s D&O policy represents the insurer’s assessment of the quality of 
the firm’s corporate governance.  Equipped with the information re-
vealed by these signals, investors and other capital market participants 
may adjust their reservation values, thereby creating a discount on the 
share price of firms whose D&O policies reveal high agency costs or 
low-quality corporate governance.  The result of this discount might 
be the creation of another incentive for firms to improve their corpo-
rate governance. 
The type of D&O coverage that a corporation purchases could 
convey an important signal to the market.  As discussed in Part III, 
D&O insurance may be intended to benefit either or both the corpo-
ration’s managers individually and the corporate entity itself.  Insofar 
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as the insurance is intended to benefit individuals, it may be a neces-
sary feature of the benefits package required to attract top-level talent 
to the firm.  Entity-level coverage, however, may trace to agency costs.  
Because it is simple to distinguish whether D&O coverage was pur-
chased to benefit individual managers, on the one hand, or the cor-
porate entity, on the other—Side A coverage only benefits individuals, 
while Side B and Side C coverages only benefit the corporate enti-
ty118—a company’s D&O package can serve as a simple proxy for 
agency costs.  A corporation purchasing only Side A coverage may suf-
fer less from agency costs than a firm that has also purchased a large 
amount of Side B and Side C coverage.119  Market participants could 
learn about the quality of a company’s governance structure simply by 
reviewing how much of each type of coverage a particular company 
has purchased. 
Second, insofar as corporations buy individual coverage in order 
to persuade directors to sit on their boards, the question arises as to 
how much coverage these individuals will require in order to accept 
the job.  Other things being equal, a relatively high level of cover-
age—high limits, low retentions—signals individual discomfort with 
the firm’s governance risk while, by contrast, low limits and high re-
tentions suggest that individual managers do not expect their firm to 
generate significant liabilities from shareholder litigation.  In this way, 
the level of coverage alone may signal the managers’ own assessment 
of governance risk. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the price the corporation 
pays for its coverage conveys important information concerning its 
governance quality.  If firms fail to continually optimize their corpo-
rate governance and firms with worse corporate governance pay more 
for D&O insurance than firms with better corporate governance, then 
118 See supra Part III.A. 
119 My conversations with insurance industry participants revealed that some firms 
do in fact purchase “Side A only coverage.”  As one executive with a major D&O un-
derwriter described it to me: 
[A] lot of companies are purchasing what we call Side A insurance only . . . 
[for] two reasons.  Number one, the company is extremely well financed.  We 
don’t care about our own exposure as a company.  You know we’ll handle 
that . . . . But we need to give some comfort to our outside board members in 
the event we ever become insolvent.  We don’t think we will but before some-
one serves on our board they want to know about our D&O insurance. 
Interview with Confidential Source, Executive, Major D&O Underwriter, in New York, 
N.Y. (Nov. 12, 2004) (transcript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view); accord Bailey, supra note 61, at 3 (“[A] D&O policy affording only Side-A cover-
age can provide greater protections to D&Os than a typical D&O insurance policy.”). 
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market participants could use D&O insurance pricing as a proxy to 
evaluate the quality of a firm’s corporate governance.  The most obvi-
ous place to look for this information is the firm’s D&O premium. 
A company’s insurance premium could be converted into a proxy 
for governance quality with a few relatively simple adjustments.  First, 
because insurance premiums depend in part on the coverage limits 
and the firm’s retention, premium data must be adjusted to effective 
coverage amounts.  This, however, would be a relatively easy adjust-
ment to make, provided that one is given data that include each com-
pany’s insurance premiums, limits, and retentions under each line of 
coverage.  Second, in addition to these features of the insurance pol-
icy itself, insurance premiums may correlate to other features of the 
corporation or its business.  Firms within a particular industry—an in-
dustry that has attracted the attention of New York Attorney General 
Eliot Spitzer, for example—may be subject to systematically higher 
D&O rates than firms in other lines of business with less industry-wide 
risk of shareholder litigation.120  However, this distortion could be cor-
rected by comparing D&O insurance pricing across a set of firms 
within a specific industry in order to identify norms and outliers.  Fi-
nally, insurance premiums may correlate to market capitalizations,121 
whether because larger firms attract more attention in shareholder 
litigation (perhaps because they appear more often on the front page 
of the Wall Street Journal) or because firms with high share prices have 
farther to fall in measuring damages.122  Similarly, the volatility of a 
120 See Howard, supra note 88, at 22 (quoting a director at Aon Professional Risks 
that “if you happen to be in an industry group that insurers perceive as extremely high 
risk at the moment, and you also happen to have your shares listed [in the United 
States], then you’re going to be paying a hell of a lot more premium than you did last 
year” (alteration in original)). 
121 See Goch, supra note 88, at 56 (“D&O underwriters price policies based on 
market capitalization of public companies . . . .”); see also John E. Core, The Directors’ 
and Officers’ Insurance Premium:  An Outside Assessment of the Quality of Corporate Govern-
ance, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449, 468 (2000) (noting that market value of equity is an 
important variable in determining the price of insurance); George D. Kaltchev, The 
Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance by US Public Companies 52 
( July 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=565183 (highlighting the correlation between 
premium price and the market value of a firm’s equity).  For a detailed discussion on 
the implications of this relationship, see infra Part V.B. 
122 This is true whether the theory of damages is the traditional “out of pocket” 
measure—i.e., the difference between what the plaintiff received and what she would 
have received had there been no fraudulent conduct—or “recessionary” damages.  See, 
e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (awarding out-of-
pocket damages in the securities fraud context); Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 
659 (1986) (granting recessionary damages in the securities fraud context). 
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firm’s share price may influence its D&O premium since shareholder 
litigation is believed to follow sudden drops in share price.123  Never-
theless, the influence of market capitalization and share price volatil-
ity on insurance pricing can be removed by adding variables to adjust 
for market capitalization and volatility. 
 Thus, in spite of some distortions in the correlation between 
insurance prices and the quality of corporate governance, with a few 
simple adjustments, a firm’s premium for D&O insurance should con-
vey important information concerning the firm’s corporate govern-
ance.  Most basically, the more a firm pays, the worse its governance.  
Moreover, because the insurer risks its own capital in making this as-
sessment, the D&O premium functions as a revealed preference and is 
therefore likely to be a reliable indicator of the insurer’s best assess-
ment of the insured’s governance quality.  Understanding this, fund 
managers, arbitrageurs, and other professional investors can be ex-
pected to build these signals into their models of firm value.  D&O in-
surance data could thus provide another data point for analysts to 
crunch as they seek to value firms.124  If D&O insurance policies reveal 
negative information—for example, unusually high premiums or a 
high degree of entity-level coverage—the corresponding negative im-
pact in the equity and credit markets may provide yet another incen-
tive for firms to optimize their corporate governance. 
V.  SENDING THE SIGNAL 
American companies do not disclose the details of their D&O 
policies.  Annual reports and other corporate filings typically do not 
include D&O coverage limits, retentions, or premiums, and firms do 
not attach copies of their D&O policies as exhibits to their public fil-
123 See sources cited supra note 30. 
124 As discussed in Part IV.A, in cases where firms are already covered by equity 
analysts, disclosure of D&O insurance information may provide useful supplemental 
information on governance quality due to (1) underwriters’ unique access to non-
public information in the underwriters’ meeting and through NDAs with the prospec-
tive insured, (2) underwriters’ unique focus on downside risk, and (3) underwriters’ 
unique incentives—through risking their own capital—to estimate risk accurately.  Ad-
ditionally, it is worth noting that many public companies do not receive any analyst 
coverage at all.  See Harrison Hong et al., Bad News Travels Slowly:  Size, Analyst Coverage, 
and the Profitability of Momentum Strategies, 55 J. FIN. 265, 269 (2000) (“[T]he reality [is] 
that many firms are simply not covered by analysts . . . .”).  Yet these firms are likely to 
purchase D&O insurance.  See supra note 66 and accompanying text (reporting that 
99% of U.S. for-profit firms purchased D&O insurance in 2004).  For such firms, the 
information signaled through the disclosure of D&O details may therefore be the only 
reliable third-party assessment of governance quality. 
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ings.  The information therefore is not publicly available.  This pre-
sents a puzzle.  If, as this Article has argued, the details of a firm’s 
D&O policy convey an important signal regarding the governance 
quality of the firm, why are these details undisclosed?  Why do indi-
vidual firms not voluntarily disclose this information?  And, since they 
do not, why does the law not require it?  Why is the signal not being 
sent? 
This Part explores these puzzles, first probing the dynamics of vol-
untary disclosure in order to account for its absence in the case of 
D&O policy information, then reviewing current state and federal law 
on D&O insurance and disclosure.  After contrasting U.S. law with 
that of a neighboring jurisdiction, Canada, which does require disclo-
sure of D&O policy details, this Part argues that the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission should require registrants to disclose de-
tails concerning their D&O policies immediately upon entering or re-
newing a policy. 
A.  Explaining the Absence of Voluntary Disclosure 
Capital market dynamics compel companies to disclose informa-
tion.  All firms that seek to raise capital from investors will seek to 
convince investors that they are issuers of high-quality securities.  Be-
cause it is difficult for investors to distinguish between high- and low-
quality securities, firms will produce information to persuade investors 
that their securities are the former rather than the latter.  This infor-
mation is credible, largely, due to the rules against fraud.125  To en-
courage investment, firms will be especially eager to release good 
news.  Firms’ natural incentive to disclose good news, however, will 
cause investors to be suspicious of and to discount the value of any 
firm not disclosing similar information.126  If the nondisclosing firm 
had similar good news, the investor will reason, it would have dis-
closed it; because it did not, it must have only bad news.  This out-
come extends the childhood maxim:  “If you don’t have something 
nice to say, don’t say anything at all.”  Firms that do not say anything 
125 Federal securities law antifraud rules include, for example, section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2000), and, perhaps most importantly, Rule 
10b-5 of the rules promulgated pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,  
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005). 
126 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 280-83 (1991) (discussing the market’s incentives on firms to dis-
close information); see also Akerlof, supra note 113, at 495-96 (describing sellers’ incen-
tives to disclose and warrant quality in an adverse selection model). 
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at all, the investor will conclude, must have nothing nice to say.  This 
logic, and the resulting discount to the value of their securities, pro-
vides all firms with an incentive to make regular disclosures of both 
the good and the bad.  Thus, firms will voluntarily create an environ-
ment of robust corporate disclosure.127
Because any piece of information that might affect the value of a 
firm’s securities—including D&O policy details—ought therefore to 
be disclosed voluntarily, the absence of such disclosures may be taken 
to imply that the information is not sufficiently valuable to merit dis-
closure.  If the information mattered, in other words, firms would re-
lease it.  Is this true of the information embedded in the details of the 
firm’s D&O policy?  Does the absence of voluntary disclosure of D&O 
policy details imply that the information does not, in fact, matter? 
Irrelevance of the information, of course, is not the only explana-
tion for a lack of disclosure.  Easterbrook and Fischel themselves iden-
tify three situations in which a regime of voluntary disclosure would 
predictably fail.128  The characteristic problem in each of these three 
situations involves information that is valuable to investors of other 
firms as well as the investors of the firm in possession of the informa-
tion.  Because the firm with the information cannot charge the inves-
tors of other firms for it, the information is likely to be underpro-
duced.129  The situations in which Easterbrook and Fischel found this 
problem included, first, the production of industry-wide, as opposed 
to firm-specific, information.  Although all firms would prefer that this 
information be made available, no one firm has an incentive to pro-
duce it since doing so would allow other firms to free-ride on its ef-
forts.130  Second, and relatedly, information that primarily facilitates 
comparisons among firms would be underproduced because the in-
formation is valuable only once several firms have made similar disclo-
sures.  No firm is willing to be the first to disclose because the infor-
mation by itself is worthless and, if it includes competitively sensitive 
information or a damaging revelation, potentially harmful.131  Finally, 
because some disclosures are easier to understand than others, there 
may be information that would be valuable to investors if disclosed in 
127 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 126, at 289 (“[A company] must dis-
close the bad with the good, else investors will assume that the bad is even worse than 
it is.”). 
128 Id. at 290-96. 
129 Id. at 290-91. 
130 Id. at 291. 
131 Id. 
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a particular format, but because no firm has an incentive to search for 
and adopt the optimal format (again because the benefits would re-
dound largely to the investors of other firms who cannot be charged), 
the information nevertheless goes undisclosed.132  In each of these 
three situations, then, a regime of voluntary disclosure can be ex-
pected to fail.133
D&O policy information has several of these features.  First and 
foremost, the value of D&O policy information is purely comparative.  
The relevance of a firm’s policy premium, payout limits, and retention 
amounts emerges only upon comparison with similarly situated firms.  
Moreover, as noted above, comparing similarly situated firms means 
taking a broad industry-wide sample and controlling for such variables 
as market capitalization and volatility.134  D&O policy data, in other 
words, are only valuable once the data are available for an entire in-
dustry.  Each of the firms within the industry, however, will be disin-
clined to produce the information because it is of value largely to in-
vestors of other firms who cannot be charged for it.  It is, in other 
words, a paradigmatic example of a situation in which voluntary dis-
closure is likely to fail. 
In addition to the free-rider effects on which Easterbrook and 
Fischel focus, investors in an individual firm may not want their firm 
to be the first to disclose D&O details for fear that disclosing the cost 
of the policy would harm the firm.135  Explicitly stating that a corpora-
tion pays millions of dollars per year to insure its executives against 
the cost of their own negligence may not sit well with investors.  The 
132 Id. at 291-92. 
133 Easterbrook and Fischel do not argue that these failures of voluntary disclosure 
are necessarily fatal, since there are information intermediaries with incentives to seek 
out valuable information regardless of whether it is voluntarily produced by firms.  
Their argument, instead, is that a regime of mandatory disclosure may be less costly 
overall than a regime in which information intermediaries are charged with resolving 
these deficiencies.  See id. at 300-14 (assessing the relative costs and benefits of manda-
tory disclosure regimes). 
134 See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. 
135 In contrast to these investors are those who hold the market portfolio and 
whose incentive therefore is to act in the best interest of all firms rather than favoring 
any one over others.  Such investors would thus favor disclosure of D&O policy infor-
mation for every firm in their portfolio.  Unfortunately, such investors are typically pas-
sive and therefore less active in determining the governance structure of firms than 
investors who focus their holdings in individual firms.  See Larry E. Ribstein, The Consti-
tutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95, 134 (1995) (“Most indi-
viduals either hold diversified portfolios of investments or invest in corporations indi-
rectly through institutions such as mutual funds.  Accordingly, they care little about 
the internal affairs of individual companies . . . .”). 
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amounts paid by a particular firm may be low when compared to peer 
firms, but absent disclosures from peer firms to enable these compari-
sons, such amounts, alone, may seem high.  In this way, investors’ 
views of D&O expenses may create a first-mover disadvantage.  Even if 
investors would prefer that all firms make such disclosures, the inves-
tors in any one firm are likely to hesitate for fear of harming that firm. 
In this way, the absence of voluntary disclosure of D&O policy de-
tails does not point to the irrelevance of the information, but rather to 
a coordination problem among investors.  All investors would prefer 
that D&O policy information generally be disclosed, but the investors 
of any one firm may be disinclined to cause it to disclose since that 
firm will not fully capture the value of its disclosure.  Additionally, the 
disclosure of D&O premiums may be damaging to a firm unless its 
competitors also disclose. 
Another objection to disclosure of D&O policy information is the 
assertion that revelation of coverage limits will expose the disclosing 
firm to greater risk of shareholder litigation.  The argument is simple:  
once plaintiffs’ lawyers know which firms have large D&O policies, 
they have an incentive to sue those firms, and once they know the pol-
icy limits, they know what to seek in settlement.  Although this argu-
ment may seem initially plausible, the disclosure of D&O policy details 
would probably have little impact on shareholder litigation for the 
simple reason that plaintiffs’ lawyers, the driving force behind share-
holder litigation, are already well informed about these matters.  It is 
no secret that virtually all public companies carry D&O insurance and 
that average limits for companies with assets in excess of $100 million 
are in the tens of millions of dollars.136  Plaintiffs’ lawyers are well 
aware of these facts and, as this is how they make their living, are likely 
to be able to estimate a particular company’s coverage within a fairly 
accurate range.137  Moreover, once in litigation, a company’s D&O 
policy must be disclosed prior to discovery, soon after the claim has 
been filed.138  As a result, it is unlikely that disclosure of such details 
136 TILLINGHAST 2004 SURVEY, supra note 6, at 33 tbl.13C (reporting total limits by 
market capitalization of U.S. public companies). 
137 Cf. Cox, supra note 37, at 512 (“[A]pproximately 96% of securities class action 
settlements are within the typical insurance coverage, with the insurance proceeds of-
ten being the sole source of settlement funds.”). 
138 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(D) (listing insurance policies as an initial disclosure 
item, prior to discovery); see also 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE §§ 26.22[4][d], .46[14] (3d ed. 2005) (analyzing the history and applicability of 
Rule 26(a)(1)(D) and the ability to discover unprivileged information in securities liti-
gation under Rule 26(b)(1)).  Because D&O policies must be disclosed soon after the 
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will add anything substantial to the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ arsenal or sig-
nificantly alter the dynamics of shareholder litigation. 
Nevertheless, even if it will not constitute a boon to plaintiffs’ at-
torneys, free-rider effects and coordination problems currently inhibit 
voluntary disclosure of D&O policy details.  Investors in each firm face 
the same incentives, and as a result, firms typically choose not to dis-
close D&O policy information.  Given the failure of voluntary disclo-
sure to trigger release of this valuable information, we must consider a 
mandatory rule. 
B.  U.S. Law on the Disclosure of D&O Insurance Information 
U.S. corporations are regulated by both state and federal law.139  
Either state corporation law or federal securities law could mandate 
disclosure of D&O policy details.  For the most part, neither does. 
1.  State Law Governing D&O Insurance 
As noted above, state corporate law places no limits on the ability 
of corporations to purchase D&O insurance.140  Regardless of whether 
the corporation would have the power under state law to indemnify its 
directors against a particular loss, it can insure them.  Moreover, state 
corporate law typically does not require disclosure of D&O policy de-
tails.  In Delaware, the primary source of American corporate law,141 
filing of a securities claim, plaintiffs’ attorneys even now are made aware of these policy 
details prior to settlement. 
139 In principle, the federal securities laws police the sale of securities, while the 
states regulate corporate governance.  However, the federal securities laws in fact cre-
ate a broad opening for federal preemption of state law, whether through further acts 
of Congress, agency rulemaking, or judicial interpretations of existing statutes.  Thus, 
in spite of the often-recited division of authority between the states and federal gov-
ernment with respect to corporate governance, the so-called internal affairs doctrine is 
a result not of a constitutional imperative but of federal forbearance.  The federal gov-
ernment could regulate the whole of corporate governance if it chose to do so.  See 
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (“Absent a clear indication of congres-
sional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corpora-
tions that deals with transactions in securities . . . .” (emphasis added)); Mark J. Roe, 
Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 597 (2003) (“[T]he internal affairs ‘doc-
trine’ is just an informal arrangement, not a hard limit on federal lawmaking.”). 
140 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
141 The number of major firms incorporating in Delaware has established Dela-
ware law as national corporate law.  See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Govern-
ance:  Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 350 (2001) (“The aggre-
gated choices of a majority of publicly traded U.S. corporations have resulted in a 
convergence on the Delaware General Corporation Law as a de facto national corpo-
rate law.”); see also Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorpo-
  
2006] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND D&O INSURANCE 1191 
 
no part of the General Corporation Law requires firms to disclose in-
formation concerning their D&O policies.142  Most states follow Dela-
ware, but New York is an exception. 
Like Delaware, New York is broadly permissive of D&O insur-
ance.143  Unlike Delaware, however, New York requires D&O insur-
ance contracts to include a retention and coinsurance in amounts 
deemed acceptable by the state’s superintendent of insurance before 
the contract can cover nonindemnifiable losses.144  Also unlike Dela-
ware, New York does not allow insurance payments, other than de-
fense costs, to be made in the event that final adjudication establishes 
material “acts of active and deliberate dishonesty” or that the director 
or officer “personally gained . . . a financial profit or other advantage 
to which he was not legally entitled.”145  Although each of these provi-
sions plainly regulates the relationship between insurer and insured to 
a much greater degree than Delaware law, these requirements may 
simply mimic the terms to which the parties would otherwise agree:  
D&O insurance contracts often include retention amounts146 and co-
insurance,147 with deliberate fraud and final adjudication of wrongdo-
ing as common exclusions.148
ration Choice:  Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1795, 1804 (2002) (supplying statistics on the rise of incorporation in Delaware). 
142 The Delaware code mentions D&O insurance only to authorize its purchase 
and expressly provide that it may cover losses regardless of whether the corporation 
itself could indemnify directors against them.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (2004). 
143 See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 726(a) (McKinney 2003) (allowing a corporation to 
insure itself and its directors and officers against liability subject to provisions in  
§ 726(b), even when the insurance contract includes a retention amount and coinsur-
ance). 
144 See id. § 726(a)(3) (“[A] corporation shall have the power to purchase and 
maintain insurance . . . [t]o indemnify directors and officers in instances in which they 
may not otherwise be indemnified by the corporation . . . provided the contract of in-
surance covering such directors and officers provides, in a manner acceptable to the 
superintendent of insurance, for a retention amount and for co-insurance.”). 
145 Id. § 726(b)(1). 
146 See, e.g., AIG Declarations Page, supra note 65, § 4 (limiting liability to losses 
over the stated retention amounts); Hartford Declarations Page, supra note 59, at 1 
(providing for retention amounts under Side A, B, and C coverage). 
147 See, e.g., Hartford Declarations Page, supra note 59, at 2 (providing for coinsur-
ance percentages for securities claims). 
148 See Hartford Specimen Policy, supra note 6, § V(J) (excluding coverage for “any 
deliberately dishonest, malicious or fraudulent act or omission or any willful violation 
of law” established by “judgment or final adjudication”); see also Chubb Specimen Pol-
icy, supra note 6, at 8-9 (excluding coverage for “any deliberately fraudulent act or 
omission”); AIG Specimen Policy, supra note 6, at § 4(c) (excluding coverage for “any 
deliberate criminal or deliberate fraudulent act by the Insured”). 
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The most significant difference between the New York and Dela-
ware statutes may be New York’s requirement of disclosure of D&O 
policy information.  Section 726(d) of the New York Business Corpo-
ration Law provides: 
The corporation shall . . . mail a statement in respect of any insurance it 
has purchased or renewed under this section, specifying the insurance 
carrier, date of the contract, cost of the insurance, corporate positions 
insured, and a statement explaining all sums, not previously reported in 
a statement to shareholders, paid under any indemnification insurance 
contract.
149
  
New York corporate law, in other words, includes a mandatory 
disclosure rule that triggers the release of some D&O policy informa-
tion in the company’s proxy statement.  Because several prominent 
firms are incorporated in New York, section 726(d) triggers the re-
lease of much interesting information.  Table 1 and Figure 1, oppo-
site, compile the D&O premiums of prominent New York corpora-
tions, including the New York Times Company (NYT), Bank of New 
York (BK), American Express (AXP), Xerox (XRX), and McGraw-Hill 
(MHP).150
149 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 726(d) (McKinney 2003). 
150 This information was derived from the companies’ respective proxy statements 
filed with the SEC, which are available from the SEC’s EDGAR database, http:// 
www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html.  The data presented here are 
only intended to illustrate the potential signaling effect of the D&O premium; as fur-
ther described in this section, because existing data do not permit controls for limits, 
retention, and coinsurance, no firm conclusions can be drawn from the information 
presented in the table or the figure.  Note also that the numbers and dates listed here 
are approximations:  several of the policies were for multiyear periods, did not always 
run concurrent with the calendar year, and included both primary and supplemental 
D&O premiums. 
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Table 1:  D&O Premiums of Selected New York Corporations 
(in thousands of dollars) 
 
Company Date 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
NYT 997 997 997 4462 7823 7233 7544 
BK 812 812 812 864 8685 7114 6546 
AXP 778 778 1211 1211 2032 13579 10962 
XRX 517 517 517 4903 4903 6892 5442 
MHP 569 538 538 538 1612 1724 1600 
 
 
Figure 1:  D&O Premiums of Selected New York Corporations 
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 Several observations emerge from these data.  First, the D&O 
premiums for all of these companies increased considerably around 
2001-2002.  This is consistent with the data reported by the Tillinghast 
survey of annual D&O premiums and evidence of the beginning of a 
hard insurance market.151  However, as illustrated in Figure 1, premiums 
did not increase at the same rate for every company.  The premium 
paid by the New York Times Company, for example, quadrupled be-
tween 2001 and 2002, then almost doubled the following year.  Mean-
while, the premium paid by the Bank of New York increased more 
than tenfold in a single policy year.  By contrast, the premiums paid by 
McGraw-Hill increased much less dramatically, tripling upon the expi-
ration of its three-year policy in 2003, but leveling off and falling im-
mediately thereafter.  This suggests that while broad characteristics of 
the insurance market influence premiums, there is still significant 
variation in premiums resulting from firm-specific characteristics. 
One of the most significant firm-specific characteristics is market 
capitalization, and it is tempting to compare D&O premiums to mar-
ket capitalization in a simple ratio dividing a firm’s annual D&O pre-
mium by its market capitalization on the effective date of the policy.  
This “D&O Premium Ratio” would enable quick comparisons between 
firms as well as checks against other governance metrics to test the 
correlation between D&O premiums and governance quality.152  Of 
course, as this Article has already noted, in order for the D&O Pre-
mium Ratio to yield useful comparisons, it must control for insurance 
limits—more coverage, after all, should yield higher premiums.153  
This adjustment to the ratio could be made easily by recalculating 
151 See TILLINGHAST, TOWERS PERRIN, 2002 DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY 
SURVEY:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF U.S. AND CANADIAN RESULTS (2002), available at 
http://www.towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/reports/Directors_and_Officers_
2002/DO_summary2002a.pdf (“The widespread and dramatic hardening of the D&O 
insurance market that began in 2001 continued during 2002 . . . . Nearly all segments 
in the U.S. saw sharp increases in premiums . . . .”).  A hard insurance market is one in 
which premiums are high and capacities are low.  Such conditions are typically fol-
lowed by soft markets in which new capacity is brought to the market and, as a result of 
this increase in available coverage, premiums fall.  See generally Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear 
is the Key:  A Behavioral Guide to Underwriting Cycles, 10 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 262 (2004) 
(explaining underwriting cycles and noting the beginning of a hard market in late 
2001). 
152 See supra note 7 (describing various metrics for rating governance quality). 
153 See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (noting the importance of calcu-
lating the cost per dollar of coverage and controlling for industry and market capitali-
zation). 
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premiums per dollar of coverage.154  Unfortunately, a glance at Table 
1 reveals that this adjustment is impossible with current data.  The 
New York statute does not require disclosure of policy limits, and most 
of the companies listed do not include it in their proxy statements.155  
Without this information, the D&O Premium Ratio cannot be calcu-
lated on a per-dollar-of-coverage basis and therefore cannot generate 
useful comparisons. 
There are several other weaknesses in the New York data.  In addi-
tion to coverage limits, retentions and coinsurance amounts are not 
disclosed, making it difficult to evaluate actual coverage amounts.  
Similarly, most companies make no effort to break out different lines 
(Side A, B, or C) of coverage.  The New York Times Company’s disclo-
sure that it has additional limits available under Side A is interesting, 
but we are ultimately no closer to understanding the exact D&O 
package purchased by the company.156  We do not know, for example, 
whether the limits under Side C are affected by different retention 
and coinsurance amounts.  As described in greater detail above, it is 
necessary to understand each of these aspects of a company’s D&O 
package before one can fully understand its cost and ultimately com-
pare the costs of similarly situated firms. 
154 Per-dollar premiums could be obtained by dividing the premium by the effec-
tive coverage limit.  This number would then be placed in the ratio over market capi-
talization.  In other words:  per dollar premium = (total annual premium / effective 
coverage limits) / market capitalization at the beginning of the policy period. 
155 Again, this could be to keep the information from plaintiffs’ lawyers, a theo-
retically unsound justification for nondisclosure.  See supra notes 136-38 and accompa-
nying text (explaining why plaintiffs’ lawyers’ knowledge of a company’s D&O limits 
will not negatively affect the company).  This justification is further weakened by the 
fact that some companies—the New York Times Company and McGraw-Hill, among 
others—do in fact disclose coverage limits.  See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., Notice of 2005 
Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement 20 (Mar. 11, 2005), available at http:// 
www.nytco.com/pdf-reports/2005_Proxy_Statement.pdf (“The aggregate limit for the 
combined insurance for D&O claims is $100 million.”); McGraw-Hill Cos., Proxy State-
ment, 2005 Annual Meeting of Shareholders 15 (Mar. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.mcgraw-hill.com/2005mhpproxy/2005mhpproxystatement.pdf (“[The Com-
pany’s D&O insurance] coverage, subject to a number of standard exclusions and cer-
tain deductibles, indemnifies the Directors and officers of the Company and its sub-
sidiaries for liabilities or losses incurred in the performance of their duties up to an 
aggregate sum of $65,000,000.”).  If such disclosures threatened to expose companies 
to higher litigation costs, it is unlikely that any company would disclose the informa-
tion. 
156 See N.Y. Times Co., supra note 155, at 20 (“If the $100 million combined limit is 
exhausted, there is a separate $50 million side limit available for directors’ and offi-
cers’ liability.”). 
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Finally, New York is not Delaware.  While several important firms 
are incorporated in New York, most are not.157  Because the signaling 
value of D&O premiums lies in comparisons between similarly situ-
ated firms, we cannot know the real significance of the D&O premi-
ums paid by any of the companies in Table 1 unless we know the pre-
miums paid by their closest competitors.  And, as long as those 
competitors incorporate in states other than New York, that informa-
tion will remain unavailable.  In sum, the D&O disclosures compelled 
by the state of New York are interesting, but ultimately unhelpful.  
Worse, until every company moves to New York, the legislators in Al-
bany cannot solve the problem.  There must be a national solution. 
2.  Federal Law and D&O Insurance 
Federal securities regulators have adopted a tortured, somewhat 
contradictory approach to the issues raised by D&O insurance.  Con-
gress has never explicitly addressed the matter, but the SEC, following 
Congress’s stated intent of inducing compliance with the securities 
laws,158 has taken a firm position against the indemnification of offi-
cers and directors for securities law violations, requiring that all regis-
trants under the Securities Act of 1933 include the following language 
in their registration statements: 
Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act 
of 1933 may be permitted to directors, officers or persons controlling 
the registrant pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the registrant has 
been informed that in the opinion of the Securities and Exchange 
157 Most prominent corporations incorporate in Delaware.  See Division of Corpo-
rations, State of Delaware,  http://www.state.de.us/corp (last visited Mar. 25, 2006) 
(noting that 60% of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware); see also 
Subramanian, supra note 141, at 1804 (“[B]y 2000 approximately half of NYSE compa-
nies were incorporated in Delaware. . . . Delaware in the 1990s had achieved a domi-
nant share of the existing corporate charter market (50%), the reincorporation mar-
ket (54%), and the IPO charter market (approximately 60%).” (footnote omitted)). 
158 See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 3, 9 (1933) (discussing civil liability for noncompli-
ance with the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and “insist[ing] that there . . . be 
full disclosure of essentially every important element attending the issue of a new secu-
rity”); S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 3 (1933) (“The Committee believes it to be essential to ac-
complish the objects of the [Securities Act of 1933] to make the directors executing 
the registration statement liable for the consequences of untrue statements.”).  See gen-
erally James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 29 (1959) (providing a personal and anecdotal account of the passage of the 
Securities Act of 1933). 
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Commission such indemnification is against public policy as expressed in 
the Act and is therefore unenforceable.
159
  
The SEC’s position on indemnification is rooted in the view that 
spreading the cost of legal sanction renders managers less likely to 
comply with the law.160  Because insuring directors and officers against 
these costs would seem to implicate precisely the same policy concerns 
as indemnifying them, it would be reasonable to suppose that the SEC 
similarly opposes D&O insurance.  This supposition, however, appears 
to be incorrect. 
The SEC takes a milder position on D&O insurance than on in-
demnification.  The SEC has not declared insurance against securities 
law liabilities to be a violation of public policy.  In fact, the SEC has 
arguably endorsed the corporate purchase of D&O insurance, stating 
that the maintenance of a D&O policy, even when paid for by the 
company, will not bar acceleration of a registration statement.161  
159 17 C.F.R. § 229.510 (2005) (requiring that this statement be included in the 
registration statements of registrants not requesting acceleration of effectiveness).  
Registrants requesting acceleration of the effective date are also required to state that, 
in the event of an indemnification claim by an officer or director, the company will 
“submit to a court . . . the question whether such indemnification by it is against public 
policy as expressed in the Act” unless its counsel opines that the issue has been re-
solved by precedent.  Id. § 229.512(h).  These line-item disclosures are triggered in 
each of the major forms governing the registration of securities.  E.g., SEC Form S-1, 
item 12A (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-1.pdf (re-
quiring applicants to “[f]urnish the information required by . . . § 229.510”); SEC 
Form S-3, item 13 (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-
3.pdf (same); SEC Form S-4, item 9 ( July 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
about/forms/forms-4.pdf (same); SEC Form S-8, item 6 (Sept. 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-8.pdf (requiring disclosure pursuant to § 
229.702, regarding the indemnification of officers and directors, but not pursuant to § 
229.510); SEC Form S-11, item 34 (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
forms/forms-11.pdf (same). 
160 See 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 556 (3d ed. 1998) 
(noting that the SEC has pressed its position that indemnification of a director or offi-
cer against statutory liabilities is unenforceable “because [such indemnification] tends 
to frustrate the in terrorem purposes of individual liability”); see also Globus v. Law Re-
search Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288-89 (2d Cir. 1969) (concurring with the SEC’s 
position and denying indemnification on the view that liability “was designed not so 
much to compensate the defrauded purchaser as to . . . deter negligence”).  Similarly, 
public policy has been held to prevent indemnification under other federal statutes.  
See, e.g., Sequa Corp. v. Gelmin, 851 F. Supp. 106, 110-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that 
an indemnification for RICO liability is against public policy). 
161 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.461(c) (2005) (“Insurance against liabilities arising under 
the Act, whether the cost of insurance is borne by the registrant, the insured or some 
other person, will not be considered a bar to acceleration . . . .”).  The SEC does, how-
ever, consider registered investment companies a special case, requiring greater scru-
tiny of insurance arrangements.  See id. (“[T]he Commission may refuse to accelerate 
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Moreover, unlike the harsh language imposed on registrants adopting 
indemnification provisions, the SEC requires only that the existence 
and “general effect” of D&O insurance policies be disclosed.162  Con-
sidering that insurance and indemnification raise the same policy con-
cerns,163 the maintenance of distinct positions seems inconsistent and, 
in any event, has never been explained by the SEC.164
The regulation that requires registrants to disclose the existence 
of D&O insurance does not require the disclosure of any policy de-
tails.  Item 702 of Regulation S-K merely requires that registrants 
“[s]tate the general effect of any statute, charter provisions, by-laws, 
contract or other arrangements under which any controlling persons, 
the effective date [for a registered investment company] that protects or purports to 
protect any officer or director of the company against any liability . . . .”); see also In-
vestment Companies and Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(h) (2000) (prohibiting “any 
provision which protects . . . any director or officer of [a registered investment com-
pany] against . . . willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence or reckless disregard 
of . . . duties”). 
162 17 C.F.R. § 229.702 (2005).  This disclosure is triggered, like the disclosures 
required by items 510 and 512(h), by each of the major forms governing the registra-
tion of securities.  See SEC Forms S-1, S-3, S-4, S-8, and S-11, available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/about/forms/secformsalpha.htm, for information required for registra-
tion under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933. 
163 Interestingly, the SEC originally treated insurance and indemnification to-
gether in item 510 of Regulation S-K, requiring disclosure of insurance arrangements 
in the subsection of the provision mandating inclusion of the policy statement on in-
demnification.  See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release 
No. 6383, Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, Investment Company Act Release No.  
12,264, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,383 (Mar. 16, 1982) (splitting what was then S-K 510(a) 
and (b) into what is now S-K 702 and 510, respectively). 
164 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 160, at 557 (“The Commission policy on in-
demnification is hardly a jewel of consistency.  It applies solely to indemnification by 
registrants and not to indemnification by insurers or by other third parties.”); Milton 
P. Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability Insurance in the 
Light of BarChris and Globus, 24 BUS. LAW. 681, 687-92 (1969) (reviewing the public 
policy considerations that arise under the SEC’s inconsistent policies on indemnifica-
tion and insurance).  The inconsistencies in the SEC’s position are several.  On its face, 
the policy applies only to violations of the Securities Act, not the Securities Exchange 
Act, and therefore captures disclosure violations in connection with securities issuance 
but not with securities fraud under section 10b-5, a distinction for which the basis is 
unclear.  Furthermore, the bar on indemnification of securities law liabilities has been 
interpreted by courts not to apply to defense costs or settlement.  See, e.g., Raychem 
Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170, 1179-80 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that in-
demnification of settlement is not against public policy); Goldstein v. Alodex Corp., 
409 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (ruling that indemnification of defense costs is 
not against public policy).  Since most securities claims are settled, these exceptions 
seem to swallow the rule. 
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director or officer of the registrant is insured or indemnified in any 
manner against liability which he may incur in his capacity as such.”165
Although the “general effect” of D&O insurance may be read to 
require some discussion of policy details, registrants generally provide 
nothing more than an opaque statement that coverage will be avail-
able, subject to unstated limits, to cover liabilities arising from the di-
rectors’ or officers’ conduct as such.166  By granting effectiveness to 
these registration statements, the SEC effectively accepts such nonde-
scriptive language in fulfillment of the required disclosure. 
The SEC could require much more detail.  The SEC could, for 
example, treat D&O insurance as a “material contract” and require 
that policies be filed as an exhibit to the registration statement.167  It 
could also treat D&O insurance as an aspect of executive compensa-
tion, triggering an extensive description of policy features, including 
the cost and value of the policy, as it does in the case of life insurance 
provided to corporate executives.168  However, the SEC has made nei-
ther of these choices, instead treating D&O insurance as a matter dis-
tinct from executive compensation and thereby minimizing the re-
quired disclosure of policy details.169
165 17 C.F.R. § 229.702 (2005). 
166 For example, in its registration statement, Yankee Candle made the following 
statement: 
Policies of insurance are maintained by Yankee Candle under which its direc-
tors and officers are insured, within the limits and subject to the limitations of 
the policies, against certain expenses in connection with the defense of, and 
certain liabilities which might be imposed as a result of, actions, suits or pro-
ceedings to which they are parties by reason of being or having been such di-
rectors or officers.  
Yankee Candle Co., Registration Statement (Form S-3), item 15 (Feb. 25, 2002),  
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1084242/000091205702007504/ 
0000912057-02-007504.txt. 
167 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10) (2005) (requiring that certain “material con-
tracts” not made in the ordinary course of business be filed as exhibits to the regis-
trant’s public filings). 
168 See id. § 229.402(b)(2)(v)(E) (requiring disclosure of the dollar value of life 
insurance provided by the corporation to its executives and the premiums paid by the 
corporation). 
169 The SEC has expressly stated that it will not treat D&O insurance as a form of 
executive compensation:  “Premiums paid for liability insurance for officers and direc-
tors and benefits paid under such insurance plans are not forms of remuneration to 
the extent that the insurance plan is intended to relieve officers and directors of liabil-
ity relating to their job performance.”  Disclosure of Management Remuneration, Se-
curities Act Release No. 5904, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,445, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 10,112, 43 Fed. Reg. 6060, 6063 (Feb. 13, 1978).  In taking 
this position, the SEC essentially follows the IRS, which similarly does not treat D&O 
insurance as executive compensation.  See Rev. Rul. 69-491, 1969-2 C.B. 22 (“[N]o in-
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It is puzzling, given both the SEC’s strident position on indemnifi-
cation and the valuable information that D&O policy details may con-
vey, that the SEC does not require disclosure of registrants’ D&O pol-
icy premiums, limits, and retentions.  This may seem especially strange 
considering the fact, explored in the next section, that Canadian se-
curities regulators require disclosure of precisely these items. 
C.  A Canadian Comparison 
Unlike their counterparts in the United States, Canadian securi-
ties regulators do require disclosure of D&O insurance details.  Public 
companies in Canada must disclose basic information concerning 
their D&O insurance policies, including coverage limits and premi-
ums, in their proxy filings and registration statements.170  This pro-
vides the opportunity to conduct a natural experiment, identifying 
whether the information disclosed in these Canadian filings can be 
used to establish a link between corporate governance and D&O in-
surance.  While economists have examined this data,171 legal differ-
ences between the two countries make it difficult to import conclu-
come results to the officers from [D&O] premium payments.”); see also KNEPPER & 
BAILEY, supra note 17, § 22.22 (discussing the IRS’s view of D&O insurance). 
170 See, e.g., Ontario Securities Commission, Form 30.  (While Form 30 applied to 
the research discussed in this section, it was superseded in late 2003 by NI 51-102.  Ca-
nadian Securities Administrators, National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure 
Obligations (Dec. 18, 2003), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/ 
Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_20031219_51-102_con-dis.pdf.)  Information offered 
by companies regarding their policies is publicly available on the Ontario Security 
Commission’s online database of public filings.  Ontario Securities Commission, Sys-
tem for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR), http://www.sedar.com.  
Canadian corporations are given express permission to purchase D&O insurance un-
der the Canadian Business Corporations Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 15, § 51(b) (amending 
R.S.C., ch. C-44, § 126(6)) (Can.) (“A corporation may purchase and maintain insur-
ance for the benefit of an [officer or director] against any liability incurred by the in-
dividual . . . in the individual’s capacity as a director or officer of the corpora-
tion . . . .”). 
171 In addition to the work of John Core, discussed below, see generally M. Martin 
Boyer & Mathieu Delvaux-Derome, The Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance in 
Canada (CIRANO, Working Paper No. 2002s-72, 2002), available at http://www.cirano. 
qc.ca/pdf/publication/2002s-72.pdf (studying the demand for D&O insurance in 
Canada); Martin Boyer, Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Shareholders’ Protection  
(CIRANO, Working Paper No. 2003s-64, 2003), available at http://www.cirano. 
qc.ca/pdf/publication/2003s-64.pdf (same); Martin Boyer, Is the Demand for Corporate 
Insurance a Habit?  Evidence of Organizational Inertia from Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance 
5-6 (CIRANO, Working Paper No. 2004s-33, 2004), available at http://www.cirano. 
qc.ca/pdf/publication/2004s-33.pdf (same). 
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sions from Canada (or any foreign jurisdiction) to American corpo-
rate governance.172
Professor John Core has performed the leading study examining 
Canadian data to determine whether D&O premiums can be related 
to corporate governance variables.173  Hypothesizing that D&O pre-
miums would be a function both of business-specific risk factors and 
governance-related risk factors, Core separated proxy variables relat-
ing to each.174  Grouping measures of ownership structure, board size, 
and management entrenchment together as indicators of “governance 
quality,” on the one hand, and firm size, financial performance, and 
U.S. exchange listing as proxies for “business risk,” on the other, Core 
regressed each variable against D&O premiums, finding approxi-
mately half of the governance quality variables to be statistically sig-
nificant, while each of the business risk variables was statistically sig-
nificant.175  Significant governance quality variables—including insider 
stock ownership and voting control, director independence, and ex-
ecutive employment contracts176—enabled Core ultimately to con-
clude that Canadian data supports an association between D&O pre-
miums and governance quality.177
One of the variables Core found to be most significant, however, 
underscores the study’s inherent limitations.  If a Canadian firm is 
also listed on a U.S. exchange, exposing it to U.S. securities litigation, 
the firm has significantly higher D&O premiums.178  This emphasizes 
the difference between U.S. and Canadian liability risks.  At least with 
172 Although the legal systems of the United States and Canada are broadly similar, 
Canada is a considerably less favorable environment for representative litigation.  See 
infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
173 See Core, supra note 121, at 449 (outlining his study and his findings). 
174 See id. at 454 (“[A] firm’s D&O premium is hypothesized to be a function of 
both the quality of its corporate governance and its business risk . . . .”). 
175 Id. at 457-62.  The business risk proxies included management experience (the 
longer the manager has been on the board, the lower the firm’s litigation risk), finan-
cial performance (the worse the firm’s return on equity, the higher its litigation risk), 
size (the greater the firm’s total assets, the higher its litigation risk), prior litigation 
(firms with a history of litigation are higher litigation risks), and U.S. operations or 
U.S. listing (both of which increase litigation risk).  Id. 
176 Id. at 463-66.  Core notes that all governance variables have the predicted sign 
and that they add explanatory power to the model as a group, even if only four of nine 
are individually significant.  Id. at 463. 
177 See id. at 451 (“The results indicate that D&O premiums are significantly higher 
when inside control of share votes is greater, when inside ownership is lower, when the 
board is comprised of fewer outside directors, when the CEO has appointed more of 
the outside directors, and when inside officers have employment contracts.”). 
178 Id. at 462. 
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regard to shareholder litigation, and perhaps representative litigation 
generally, the legal systems between the two countries are different 
enough to make cross-country comparisons somewhat tenuous.  Can-
ada retains the English “loser pays” system, increasing the risk borne 
by plaintiffs’ lawyers.179  As a result, contingent fees are used less often 
and, when they are used, are subject to a reasonableness standard.180  
In addition, class actions and derivative suits are filed less often, per-
haps because punitive damages are rarely awarded.181  The Canadian 
environment, on the whole, is thus considerably less favorable for en-
trepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers.182  As a result, although Core’s study 
ultimately supports a link between corporate governance and D&O 
insurance, U.S. data are needed to confirm the result. 
In a recent paper, Professor George Kaltchev attempts to develop 
his own U.S. data set from proprietary and confidential information 
supplied by two insurance brokerage firms.183  Kaltchev’s data set in-
cludes information on insurance limits and retentions—that is, data 
on the amount of D&O insurance purchased—for almost 300 compa-
nies, which he then used to test hypotheses for why companies pur-
chase D&O insurance.184  Perhaps unsurprisingly, Kaltchev finds that 
the best predictor of D&O limits is the insured company’s market 
capitalization.185  After size, the leading indicators of insurance amounts 
seem to be returns, with larger returns on assets tending to produce 
lower insurance limits.186  This could be taken to suggest that better 
managers are less likely to insist on high levels of D&O insurance or, 
relatedly, that companies that perform better are less likely to be sued.  
Alternately, an inverse relationship between returns and coverage lim-
179 See id. at 451 n.2 (describing relevant differences between the Canadian and 
American legal systems). 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 See Ronald J. Daniels & Susan M. Hutton, The Capricious Cushion:  The Implica-
tions of the Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Liability Crisis on Canadian Corporate Govern-
ance, 22 CAN. BUS. L.J. 182, 216-20 (1993) (arguing that the differences in U.S. and 
Canadian legal liabilities for corporate directors and officers can at least partially ex-
plain why Canadian corporations purchase significantly less D&O insurance than their 
American counterparts). 
183 See Kaltchev, supra note 121, at 34 (outlining his data and methodology). 
184 Id. 
185 See id. at 52 (“[The market value of firm equity] appears to be directly related 
to limits, as a measure of the potential size of loss.”).  This is as one would expect since 
the larger the market capitalization, the greater the potential damages in shareholder 
litigation. 
186 Id. 
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its may simply indicate that firms with large cash flows can more easily 
self-insure against litigation risk.  Kaltchev’s findings also support a 
significant relationship between indicators of financial health, as indi-
cated by leverage and volatility, and D&O coverage limits:  the higher 
a company’s leverage and volatility, the more insurance it buys.  Of 
the corporate governance variables tested, it is worth noting that 
companies that have not split the chief executive and chairperson of 
the board functions tend to buy more D&O insurance and that direc-
tor and officer ownership of firm stock correlates to lower policy lim-
its.187
A significant weakness of the Kaltchev study, however, is that it 
lacks information on insurance pricing.  Because almost every firm 
purchases D&O insurance and because losses correlate to size, insur-
ance pricing is more likely to be sensitive to governance variables than 
coverage limits or overall demand.  Kaltchev was unable to produce 
this data from his confidential U.S. sources, while Core, in spite of ac-
cess to pricing information through Canadian firms’ proxy statements, 
was subject to limitations in making comparisons across legal systems 
that, at least on the issue of shareholder litigation, are significantly dif-
ferent.  Thus, the only way to provide researchers and market partici-
pants with the information embedded in the D&O insurance pre-
mium may be to mandate disclosure of such data in U.S. securities 
law.  This is the solution proposed in the next section. 
D.  The SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of D&O Insurance Details 
The law should be changed to require disclosure of more details 
concerning a company’s D&O policies.  In addition to disclosing the 
existence of a policy, companies should be required to disclose the 
identity of the insurer, the limits and retention under each side type 
of coverage (Side A, B, and C), and perhaps most importantly, the 
D&O premium.  Each of these disclosures should be required on a 
regular basis—as each policy is entered or renewed—and, taken to-
gether, should provide a valuable indicator of corporate governance 
quality that is currently unavailable to capital market participants. 
187 See id. at 36 (relating these findings and arguing that they confirm “the hy-
pothesis that higher managerial ownership aligns the interests [of] managers and 
shareholders and [that] insurance and ownership are . . . substitutes”).  But see Core, 
supra note 121, at 464-65 tbl.2 (finding, in the Canadian data set, that separation be-
tween chief executive and chairperson roles does not affect premiums). 
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This Article has argued that the price a firm pays for its D&O cov-
erage—the insurance premium—will convey an important signal con-
cerning the quality of the firm’s governance.  Requiring disclosure of 
the firm’s D&O premium would thus enhance the ability of investors 
to value the firm, and requiring it on a regular basis would ensure 
current information, perhaps alerting investors to sudden shifts in 
governance risk.  If, for example, a firm’s D&O insurance significantly 
increased in a year in which similarly situated firms experienced no 
change in premium, investors would be put on notice that some as-
pect of the firm’s governance may have changed.  Moreover, because 
the governance assessment implicit in the insurance premium is based 
in part on private information provided to the D&O insurer through 
meetings and nondisclosure agreements,188 the signal conveyed by a 
change in insurance premiums may alert investors to information that 
is otherwise unavailable to them. 
Details on the amount of D&O insurance purchased—that is, the 
company’s policy limits and retentions—would also provide several vi-
tal pieces of information.  First, without information on the amount of 
insurance purchased, data on premiums would be too noisy to be 
meaningful.  Information on limits and retentions is necessary to spec-
ify precisely what the company is paying for and to enable compari-
sons across firms.189  Moreover, requiring information about the 
amount of coverage under each type of coverage—that is, Side A, B, 
and C—would provide additional signals to the market.  As described 
in Part III.A, Side A coverage is the only form of coverage that benefits 
officers and directors individually.  The amount of Side A coverage 
purchased by a firm could thus convey an important signal about the 
confidence of its managers regarding the liability risks they expect to 
face.  Sanguine managers may not require their firms to purchase as 
much coverage as their less confident peers at different firms.  As a re-
sult, other things being equal, a firm purchasing lower amounts of 
Side A insurance may tend to pose less risk of shareholder litigation.  
Unlike Side A coverage, Side B and Side C coverages benefit the com-
pany only and, as described above, may be rooted in managerial 
agency costs.  As a result, a company purchasing large amounts of 
coverage under Side B and Side C sends a signal not only that its 
managers believe the firm presents a relatively large risk of share-
188 See supra note 108 and accompanying text (describing the use of NDAs between 
insurers and prospective insureds in the underwriting process). 
189 See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text (describing the need to take lim-
its into account when calculating the D&O Premium Ratio). 
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holder litigation, but also that it has the kind of managers who would 
rather waste corporate assets in a negative net present value invest-
ment than put their personal compensation packages at risk by allow-
ing the firm to self-insure against shareholder litigation. 
Finally, the identity of the D&O insurer would provide valuable in-
formation about the gatekeeper itself.190  In addition to the obvious 
importance of the insurer’s financial rating, different insurers may 
have different reputations for screening governance risk.191  As a re-
sult, investors may draw different conclusions if, for example, a com-
pany’s primary D&O insurer is a market leader in D&O insurance or 
an unknown, cut-rate insurer.  The cut-rate insurer may have an in-
centive to lower premiums irrespective of governance risk in order to 
capture greater market share.  Although this will be a losing strategy 
in the long run, upstart firms may try it in the short run to establish a 
set of clients, hoping to make up for the increased near-term risk with 
greater premiums in the future.  More directly, some insurers may de-
velop a reputation for compiling better risk pools than others with the 
result, as with investment banks in securities offerings, that companies 
covet the opportunity to do business with a “prestige” player.192
Given the potential value of this information to market partici-
pants, the SEC should change the relevant regulations to force corpo-
rations to provide it.  This would be a technically simple matter.  The 
SEC could amend Regulation S-K item 702 to mandate—instead of a 
190 Disclosure of the identity of the insurer should include the larger corporate 
group, if any, of which the D&O insurer is a member.  Federal Insurance Company, for 
example, is a Chubb company.  Chubb Corp., Chubb Subsidiaries, http://www.chubb. 
com/corporate/chubb2403.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).  National Union Fire In-
surance Company of Pittsburgh is a division of AIG.  Am. Int’l Group (AIG), Welcome 
to National Union, http://www.aignationalunion.com/nationalunion/public/nathome 
(last updated Jan. 19, 2006). 
191 A.M. Best Company and a handful of other firms rate the financial strength of 
insurance companies.  See, e.g., A.M. Best Co., Best’s Ratings Methodology, http:// 
www.ambest.com/ratings/methodology.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2006) (describing rat-
ings methodologies and gradations).  Insurance companies disclose the ratings they 
receive.  See, e.g., Am. Int’l Group (AIG), Form 10-K (May 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012305006884/y03319e10vk.htm 
(disclosing financial ratings); Chubb Corp., The Chubb Corporation Financial 
Ratings, http://www.chubb.com/investors/chubb2879.html (giving Chubb’s ratings 
from A.M. Best, Fitch Ratings, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s). 
192 On the role of “prestige” underwriters in securities offerings, see generally 
Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789, 819 
(1988) (supporting the certification function of “prestige” underwriters); Glenn A. 
Wolfe et al., An Analysis of the Underwriter Selection Process for Initial Public Offerings, 17 J. 
FIN. RES. 77, 89 (1994) (“[P]restigious investment bankers attempt to manage the risk 
associated with underwriting unseasoned new issues.”). 
  
1206 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 1147 
 
weak statement of the “general effect” of insurance arrangements—
explicit disclosure of the registrant’s D&O premium, its limits and re-
tentions under each type of coverage, and the identity of the regis-
trant’s D&O insurance carriers.  Then, in order to force registrants to 
make this disclosure regularly, the SEC could add a cross-reference in 
Form 8-K to the amended Regulation S-K item 702, thereby requiring 
registrants to disclose detailed information on D&O insurance when 
they change or renew their coverage.193
Although such modifications would be technically simple, the SEC 
may encounter political resistance to this change, both from regis-
trants and insurers.  Their most likely objection—that mandating dis-
closure of D&O insurance details will encourage the filing of non-
meritorious lawsuits by plaintiffs’ lawyers eager to reach insurance 
assets—is, as we have already seen, easily countered.  Because plain-
tiffs’ lawyers already understand these details, there is little likelihood 
that such disclosures will change the dynamics of shareholder litiga-
tion.194
There may, however, be a subtext to such objections.  Registrants 
may resist the disclosure of D&O insurance data because, as described 
above, it threatens to reveal new information about the extent of their 
agency costs.  This, of course, is precisely why the SEC should require 
these disclosures.  Moreover, not every company will suffer from the 
release of this information.  There will be companies, for example, 
that pay relatively little in D&O premiums or that purchase only Side 
A coverage, both of which signal good governance and low agency 
costs.195  Uncovering such information would generate positive data 
and, potentially, result in a positive adjustment in share price for these 
193 Registrants are required to report certain material transactions on Form 8-K 
pursuant to sections 13 and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  15 U.S.C.  
§§ 78m, 78o (2000 & Supp. II 2002); see also SEC Form 8-K, § 1.01, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf (requiring disclosure of entry into a 
material definitive agreement).  In addition to the change in securities regulation trig-
gering disclosure, state insurance regulations may need to be changed to enable insur-
ance commissioners to police the possibility that corporations will seek to enter into 
tying arrangements with their carriers and engage in other attempts to degrade the 
quality of disclosure by, for example, paying a higher premium for property and casu-
alty coverage in order to receive a discount for D&O coverage. 
194 See supra text accompanying notes 136-38 (explaining that plaintiffs’ lawyers 
can already accurately estimate figures for particular companies). 
195 Consider the example of McGraw-Hill in Table 1; its premiums increased con-
siderably less than other companies in the same market.  McGraw-Hill’s ability to keep 
its premiums relatively low may suggest that it was a more attractive risk over the rele-
vant period than other firms seeking D&O insurance at the same time. 
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firms.  In addition, disclosure of the amount that all registrants pay for 
D&O coverage may make the market for D&O insurance more com-
petitive.  If, when renewing its policy, a company is able to cite the 
lower premiums paid by several of its competitors, it can force the in-
surer to justify its own premium and, perhaps, bargain for lower pre-
miums itself.  This improved transparency would thus benefit all com-
panies in the market for D&O insurance.196
Making the market for D&O coverage more competitive may be 
precisely what the insurance industry would like to avoid.  Insurance 
industry objections to mandatory disclosure may thus be rooted in the 
fear that such disclosures will drive rates down and make it even more 
difficult for insurers to profit from their professional liability lines.  
But this again would be a strange objection to credit since it is rooted 
in inefficiencies and market power.  From a public policy perspective, 
these are problems to be solved, not rights to be protected, and man-
dating disclosure of D&O premiums is a step in the direction of solv-
ing them. 
The likely objections to mandatory disclosure of D&O insurance 
details from registrants and insurance companies are not highly prin-
cipled.  The basic benefit of this disclosure is improvement of capital 
market efficiency through the signaling effects provided by D&O pol-
icy details.  A possible side-benefit of mandatory disclosure of this in-
formation is the improvement of product market efficiency for this 
line of insurance.  The SEC thus has strong arguments at its disposal 
to answer the narrow, self-interested objections of registrants and the 
insurance industry.  Moreover, the modification to the existing regime 
of securities regulation would be technically simple to accomplish.  
Because the benefits thus appear to overwhelm the costs, the SEC 
should change the law to mandate disclosure of D&O policy details in 
the securities filings of registered companies. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored the connection between corporate gov-
ernance and D&O insurance.  On the basis of D&O insurers’ incen-
tives to act as gatekeepers and guarantors, screening and pricing cor-
196 It would not benefit insurance brokers, however, who as intermediaries in these 
transactions purport to add value through their special knowledge and expertise of the 
marketplace.  If this information were made publicly available, the need for intermedi-
aries would be reduced.  Although the brokers may object, this may actually be another 
benefit of disclosure. 
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porate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk 
pools, this Article has advanced the hypothesis that, other things be-
ing equal, firms with relatively worse corporate governance pay higher 
D&O premiums.  A company’s D&O insurance premium could thus 
signal important information concerning the firm’s governance qual-
ity to investors and other capital market participants.  Unfortunately, 
the signal is not being sent.  Corporations lack the incentive to pro-
duce this disclosure themselves, and the SEC currently does not re-
quire registrants to provide this information.  As a result, this Article 
has advocated a change to U.S. securities regulation, making disclo-
sure of D&O policy details—specifically, premiums, limits, and reten-
tions under each type of insurance, as well as the identity of the in-
surer—mandatory.  Because such disclosure would improve the 
amount and quality of information in the capital markets, would cost 
very little to implement, and does not give rise to a principled objec-
tion, this Article urges the SEC to adopt this proposed reform as soon 
as possible. 
 
